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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TAXATION: A CRITIQUE OF DOBSON v. COMMISSIONER:
FINALITY OF TAX COURT'S DETERMINATIONS OF
TAX ACCOUNTING QUESTIONS
The Supreme Court recently wrote a new chapter on the finality to be ac-
corded to determinations of the Tax Court in Dobson v. Connvissioner, 320
U. S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct. 239 (1943), petition for rehearing denied, 321 U. S. 231,
64 Sup. Ct. 495 (1944). Reiterating the often-stated,' though reluctantly fol-
lowed 2 rule that absolute finality must be accorded to the Tax Court's findings
of fact, the Court extended this rule of finality to the Tax Court's determina-
tions of tax accounting practice. The extent to which the Court thereby
relinquished its supervision of tax accounting methods was unprecedented
and appeared out of line with a Supreme Court decision of only eight months'
priority.2 But how much of the Dobson decision is still law has suddenly
become highly debatable, for the Supreme Court within five months handed
down two other decisions 2b which have cast considerable doubt on the mean-
ing of the Dobson decision.
The dispute in the Dobson case involved 200 shares of corporate stock
purchased by the taxpayer and later sold in 1930 and 1931 at substantial
losses. In those years taxpayer took deduqtions for these losses in his federal
income tax returns, but since his tax returns, exclusive of these deductions,
would have shown deficits, the deductions did not offset any taxable in-
come, and thus effected no tax benefit. Years later, taxpayer, learning that
he had been induced to purchase the stock by fraud, brought suit for recission,
tendering the proceeds of the prior sales, and by settlement in 1939 recov-
ered less than his total losses. Taxpayer never reported as income any part
of the recovery. Adjustment of his tax liability for 1930 and 1931, the
years of the deductions in issue, was barred by the statute of limitations
in 1939.
The issue defined by the above facts is: Where a deduction does not re-
sult in tax benefit in the year taken, should a recovery in a subsequent
1E.g., see Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123, 55 Sup. Ct. 732 (1935); Elmhurst
Cemetery v. Comm'r, 300 U. S. 37, 57 Sup. Ct. 324 (1936); Helvering v. Lazarus
& Co., 308 U. S. 252, 60 Sup. Ct. 209 (1939); Wilmington Co. v. Helvering, 316
U. S. 164, 62 Sup. Ct. 984 (1941).2See GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION (1940) 134. To
avoid the rule, courts will often say there is no substantial evidence to support the
ultimate finding. See, e.g., Denniston v. Comm'r, 106 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
Or, as recognized by the court in the principal case, courts will argue that the question
involved is one of law, not of fact, 320 U. S. at 501, 64 Sup. Ct. at 246.2
'Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S. 523, 63 Sup. Ct. 1260 (1943). See
text infra at p. 518 et s eq.2bSecurity Flour Mills Co. v. Comm'r, 321 U. S. 281, 64 Sup. Ct. 596 (1944); and
Douglas v. Comm'r, 12 U. S. L. WEEK 4385 (May 15, 1944). See text infra at
p. 522 et seq.
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year be included in gross income in the year of recovery? 3 The Board of
Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court), applying the tax benefit rule, treated
ihe-deduction as if it had never been taken and decided the main issue in
the negative.4 On appeal the circuit court reversed on the ground that, in
the absence of statute or Treasury regulations, the application of the tax
benefit rule was improper as a matter of law.5 The Supreme Court held:
(1) the circuit court erred in treating as a question of law what was only
a question of proper tax accounting practise; and (2) in matters of tax.
accounting, as in all other matters of fact, the determinatiohs of the Tax
Court are final and unreviewable in the absence of statute or regulations
prescribing a fixed method of accounting.
I
The holding ,in the Dobson case is thus twofold. The first part of the
holding involves an important and novel question; namely, whether the
so-called tax benefit rule, described in the margin,6 is, in the absence of stat-
ute, a matter of law involving equitable considerations, or merely a matter
of tax accounting. The question is, at least, arguable. 7 The Supreme Court,
3Other than the issue to be discussed in thiscomment, the first Dobson decision and
the later decision on the petition for rehearing resolved the following three issues, not
involved in the facts given supra:
(1) Should a recovery be included in taxable income in so far as it represents prior
losses, the deductions for which effected tax benefits in the year of the deduction?
Held, yes.
(2) If the answer to question (1) is yes, should the recovery described in (1) be
taxable as ordinary income or as capital gain? Held, ordinary income.
(3) What'significance is to be attached to taxpayer's failure to avail himself of
certain allowable personal exemptions and credits for dependents because other deduc-
tions offset all his taxable income for that year? Held, none, where the Tax Court
so rules.4Estate of Collins, 46 B. T. A. 765 (1942).
5 Harwick v. Comm'r, 133 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
OThe tax benefit rule provides that where deductions for losses did not effect a reduc-
tion of tax liability, amounts subsequently recovered on the loss constitute a non-taxable
recoupment of loss, rather than taxable income. G. C. M. 20854, 1939-1 (Part 1)
Cum. BULL. 102; Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today (1943) 57 HAv. L. REV. 129;
Estate of Collins, 46 B. T. A. 765 (1942). This rule imposes a limitation on the
general rule that where deductions are taken for losses, such deductions are deemed
to constitute a recoupment for tax purposes; and a subsequent recovery must be in-
cluded in gross income for the taxable year in which received, since the prior deduction
has already given the txpayer all the recoupment to which he is entitled. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 94, Art. 23 (k)-1; Plumb, op. cit. supra at 130-131. The general rule is based
on the theory that the portion of income which is not taxed as a result of the deduc-
tion for loss represents, in effect, the monetary return which would othervise be
necessary to effect a recoupment. Estate of Collins, supra, at 769. The rationale of
the tax benefit rule is this: Where the taxpayer had no income in the year of the
deduction, the deduction did not in fact accomplish the recoupment which under the
general rule is deemed to be effected by a portion of his income going tax-free. Only
by a subsequent recovery of the loss can the taxpayer truly receive a recoupment;
and until the income tax equivalent of a full recoupment is effected, a recovery of
loss is not income. G. C. M. 20854, 1939-1 (Part 1) Cu.t. BULL. 102.7Application of the tax benefit rule seems to be more than a mere method of
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by virtue of its affirmance of the Tax Court's determination on the ground
that such a determination was in the nature of a finding of fact, and by
virtue of its express statement that it was "not adopting any rule of tax
benefits," 8 seemed to take the position that a question of the applicability
of the tax benefit rule is, in the absence of statute, a matter of tax accounting
practice. The effect of this holding was to sanction the extension of the
tax benefit rule, which is already applied in many other situations,9 to re-
coveries of stock losses.
It is primarily the purpose of this comment to examine the second part
of the Dobson holding, that is, the rule of finality laid down by the Supreme
Court, with respect to its desirability, its consistency with some prior Su-
preme Court decisions, and the likelihood of its survival.
The desirability of placing on the shoulders of the Tax Court, which "is
accounting in the nature of a' finding of fact. It has been called a principle of equity.
Harwick v. Comm'r, 133 F. (2d) 732, 735 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) ; cf. Plumb, op. cit. supra
,note 6, at 129; see also Stone, C. J., dissenting in Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering,
319 U. S. 523, 529, 63 Sup. Ct. 1260, 1263 (1943), indicating that he believed failure to
Comm'r, 320 U. S. 489, 502, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 247 (1943). Indeed, the application of
the tax benefit rule resembles "mixed questions of law and fact," which, when resolved
by the Tax Court, are always reviewable. Marsch v, Comm'r, 110 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940); Bynum v. Comm'r, 113 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941). But cf. Dobson v.
Comm'r, 320 U. S. 489, -, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 247 (1943). Indeed, the application of
the tax benefit rule in computing income approximates the application of a criterion in
determining value, which is also reviewable. Powers v. Comm'r, 312 U. S. 259, 61
Sup. Ct. 509 (1940); Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942);
Meadow Land & Improvement Co. v. Comm'r, 124 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942).
8320 U. S. at 506, 64 Sup. Ct. at 249.
9It is not the object of this comment to discuss the development of the rule and its
present application; that task has been amply handled elsewhere. See Plumb, op. cit.
supra note 6. Suffice it to say that the rule is now applied by statute [INT. REV. CODE
§ 22(b) (12), added by Revenue Act of 1942 § 116] and regulations [U. S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.22(b) (12)-1] to recoveries of bad debts, prior taxes and delinquency amounts,
and also by statute to recoveries of war losses [INT. REv. CODE § 127(c) (2), added by
Revenue Act of 1942 § 157(b)]; by a long line of Board opinions it is applied to the
rebate or cancellation of interest and expenses [Chenango Textile Corp., 1 T. C. 147
(1942) (N. A.); Barnhart-Morrow Consolidated, 47 B. T. A. 590 (1942); Amsco
Wire Products Corp., 44 B. T. A. 717 (1941) (N. A.) ; see also cases cited in 1
MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON CORPOIVATIONS (1943) 556; and Plumb, op. cit. Mpra
note 6, at 140; and see cases collected in 1 Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. fff 7359,
7372] and to the recoupment of losses generally [Edward E. Marshall, 10 B. T. A.
1140 (1928)).
There is considerable question whether the rule may be applied to allow a second
deduction to be taken where the prior deduction resulted in no tax benefit. [See Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Magruder, 50 F. Supp. 817 (D. Md. 1943) (appeal pending), allow-
ing duplicate deductions for bad debts. Contra: Bank of Newberry, 1 T. C. 374
(1942) (acq.).] The rule has been held inapplicable to deductions for depreciation
[Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. -S. 523, 63 Sup. Ct. 1260 (1943) (5-4
decision)] and depletion [Douglas v. Comm'r, 12 U. S. L. WEEx 4385 (May 15, 1944),
aff'g 134 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A 8th, 1943) (affirmance by virtue of an equally divided
Supreme Court; see note 38 infra)], and deductions for ordinary business expenses in-
curred in the performance of a contract [Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359,
51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931)]. It is also said not to apply to deductions for the issuance of
corporate bonds at a discount [See G. C. M. 22163, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 76, 80].
1944]
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relatively better, staffed for its task than is the judiciary,"'1 the ultimate
responsibility to determine proper tax accounting methods can hardly be
questioned. But for the Court to indicate that questions of tax accounting
are not reviewable, where there is no controlling statute, because they are
in the nature of questions of fact seems open to doubt; for whether a par-
ticular tax accounting method is legitimate frequently involves reviewable
questions of law, not mere questions of fact. In a fairly similar case where
the Board of Tax Appeals had ruled that certain sums received by a tax-
payer constituted a recoupment of sums previously spent, the circuit court
reversed the Board on the ground that such a finding was not in the class
of an unreviewable determination of disputed testimony or a finding as to
the weight of evidence, but rather an indulgence in a fictional theory of
computation." Similarly, it would appear, a finding that a certain recovery
does not constitute income, which rests not on pure fact, but on an equitable
theory,12 like the tax benefit rule, should be subject to review. In view ot
its refusal to review the merits of the Dobson case, the Supreme Court must
be taken to have laid down a broad rule that thenceforth matters of tax
.accounting, though possibly involving some questions of law, were, in the
absence of statute or regulations, to be left as exclusively to the jurisdiction
of the Tax Court as matters of fact had theretofore been.
This was not the first time the Supreme Court bad indicated a willingness
to relinquish its supervision of tax accounting. As early as 1930, it held
that the determination of whether losses should be deducted in the year
sustained calls for "a practical, not a legal test" ;13 and much discretion in
prescribing proper practice should be allowed the administrative board
charged with the duty of enforcing the revenue acts.
Nevertheless, that the present members of the Supreme Court unanimously
accepted as conclusive the Tax Court's determination that the tax benefit
rule should be applied to deductions for stock losses is surprising in view
of this same Court's utter disregard of the Tax Court's determination- of the
applicability of the tax benefit rule to deductions for depreciation in the
earlier Virginian Hotel Corporation case, 14 decided by a 5-4 Court last term.
'OJackson, J., in Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U. S. at 498, 64 Sup. Ct. at 245.
"1Tunnel R.R. of St. Louis et al. v. Comm'r, 61 F. (2d) 166, 173 (C. C. A. 8th,
1932), rev'g 17 B. T. A. 1135 (1929), cert. den., 288 U. S. 604, 53 Sup. Ct. 396 (1932).
12See note 7 supra.
13Lucas v. American Code' Co., 280 U. S. 445, 449, 50 Sup. Ct. 202, 203 (1930).
14Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S. 523, 63 Sup. Ct. 1260 (1943). For
several years taxpayer reported depreciation of certain assets on a straight line basis
at rates of 15% and 10%, taking the appropriate deductions therefor. Because no tax-
able income was earned during these years, the deductions effected no tax benefit. The
Commissioner, determining that the rates of depreciation were too high, readjusted them
to 8% and 5%, but refused to readjust the property basis so as to compensate for the
excessive, eroneous deductions, and assessed a deficiency computed on the depreciation
basis as adjusted by amounts equal to the excessive deductions. Held, four judges dis-
senting, depreciation basis must be adjusted downward by amount of prior excessive
deductions, irrespective of whether any tax benefit was effected.
Although the Virginian Hotel case deals with the effect of deductions on the ad-
justment of the depreciation basis, whereas the Dobson case deals with adjustment of
[Vol. 29
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The Virgiian case dealt with the effect to be given to excessive deductions
for depreciation in determining the proper adjustment of the property basis,
where such deductions effected no tax benefits. The Court gave no con-
sideration to the Tax Court's ruling, concerning itself only with the inter-
pretation to be given to section'. 113(b) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which prescribes the method of making adjustments for depreciation.
II
The Virginian Hotel and the Dobson cases present analogous problems.Although this was recognized and urged upon the Court in the briefs filed
by both the taxpayer and the government in the Dobson case,15 the Dobson
decision not only does not attempt to distinguish the two cases, but does
not even refer to the Virginian decision. It may be that the Court felt that
the two cases were not comparable, in that the latter case deals with the
determination of the proper basis for depreciation, while the former is con-
cerned with whether certain recoveries constitute income or a mere return
of capital. But the solution of both problems can only be reached by ascer-
taining the property basis, which is required to be adjusted to the extent
of deductions for various items. Both cases turn upon the same question: In
computing adjustment of the property- basis, what significance is to be at-
tached to deductions-in the one case for depreciation, in the other for stock
losses-which effect no tax benefits? Further, certain elements in the two
cases appear to be very similar: Investment in a depreciable asset corresponds
to investment in stock in that both are assets; the loss of capital resulting
from the depreciatiohi of an asset is basically the same as the capital loss
resulting from stock losses; in both situations the loss is accompanied by
a downward adjustment of the value of the investment for income tax pur-
poses ;16 in both situations the loss is compensated for in the same way, by
the allowance of a deduction ;17 and in both situations the deduction is re-
garded as a recoupment of loss for tax purposes.' s
Despite all these similarities, the Supreme Court differed in its approach
to the two cases. The entire Court in the Virginian Hotel case, contrary
to their later unanimous ruling in the Dobson case, accorded no finality
to the Tax Court in deciding upon the applicability of the tax benefit rule,
the cost basis, the two bases are proclaimed by statute to be computed and adjusted in
the same way. [See INT. REV. CODE §§ 23(n), 114(a), 113(a), 113(b) (1) (B).] While
the incidents of the adjustment of the cost basis differ from those of the adjustment of the
depreciation basis-the latter affects the value of the property for purposes of com-
puting the yearly depreciation, and the former affects the value of the property only
for purposes of sale or other disposition-a holding as to the one is equally applicable
to the other. MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 273.
15 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, 8-9, and Petitioners' Reply Memorandum,
2, Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U. S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct. 239 (1943).16INT. REv. CODE § 113(b) (1) (A) (stock losses) ; INT. RaV. CODE § 113 (b) (1) (B)
(depreciation).1 INT. REV. CODE § 23(e), limited by § 23(g) to the extent provided in § 117(b) and
(d) (2) (stock losse6); INT. REV. CODE § 23(1) (depreciation).
'
8Estate of Collins, 46 B. T. A. 765, 769 (1942) (stock losses); United States v..
Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 303, 47 Sup. Ct. 608, 611 (1927) (depreciation).
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and instead reviewed the question on the merits, deeming it to be a question
of statutory interpretation to be decided ultimately by the judiciary, rather
than a mere question of tax accounting to be determined conclusively by the
Tax Court.
This apparent inconsistency in the holdings would be readily explairiable,
if the relevant statute in the Virginian Hotel case prescribed a definite rule
on the applicability of the tax benefit principle, while the statute in the
Dobson ease did not; for it seems undisputed that where a definite method
of accounting is prescribed in the statute, its application becomes a question
of law subject to revew by the judiciary, rather than an ordinary tax account-
ing question in the nature of an unreviewable question of fact. Not even
the Dobson decision can be cited as according finality to the Tax Court
where the statute contains a fixed rule.
But the Dobson, decision did not attempt to explain its apparent incon-
sistency with the Virginian decision along these lines. This is understandable,
since both cases involve the same section of the Code, 113(b) (1), providing
that "Proper adjustment ... of the property shall in all cases be made--"
for various deductions enumerated in paragraph (A) (involved in the Dobson
case), such as "expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly charge-
able to capital account," and in paragraph (B) (involved in the Virginian
case), such as depreciation ''to the extent allowed (but not less than the
amount allowable). . . ." Paragraph (B) obviously does not lay down an
express rule regarding the applicability of the tax benefit rule any more
than does paragraph (A).
If a fixed rule is to be found in paragaph (B) which would explain the
seeming inconsistency between the Virginian Hotel and Dobson decisions, it
can only be found by an interpretation which reads in such a fixed rule. All
the members of the Court in the Virginian case did read a fixed rule into
paragraph (B), the majority claiming that the statute definitely precluded,
and the minority claiming that the statute affirmatively prescribed, applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule.
It remains to be considered whether there is justification for so interpreting
paragraph (B) ; for, if there is, the Virginian and Dobson decisions are re-
concilable because of the presence of a fixed rule in the former case, and
the absence of such a rule in the latter. In reaching their conclusion in the
Virginian, case, the justices completely ignored the "proper adjustment"
phrase of section 113(b) (1), upon which the Dobson decision seems partly
to have been based,'9 and focused their attention exclusively on language
9Two sentences in the Dobson decision give rise to a doubt as to whether the
holding was based on the words "proper adjustment," in section 113(b) (1), or on
the words "properly chargeable," found only in paragraph (A) and thus applicable
only to the Dobson case:
What, in the circumstances of this case, was a proper adjustment of the basis
was thus purely an accounting problem.... Evidently the Tax Court thought
that the previous deductions were not altogether "properly chargeable to capital
account" and that to treat them as an entire recoupment of the value of Tax-
payer's stock would not have been a "proper adjustment." (320 U. S. at 504,
64 Sup. Ct. at 248. Italics added.)
Logic, however, compels the conclusion that the power given to the Tax Court to
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in paragraph (B), requiring that the property be adjusted for deductions
"to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount allowable). '"20 The
Court was not concerned with the effect of "allowable" deductions on the
adjustment of the property basis, but only with the effect of deductions
"allowed" in 6xcess of what was legally allowable; for as to "allowable"
deductions for depreciation, it is universally agreed that, because of certain
policy considerations, 2- yearly adjustment must be made, regardless of
whether such deductions effect a tax benefit.2 2
The majority, predicating their opinion on this accepted treatment of the
word "allowable" as used in the statute, gave paragraph (B) a very literal2
interpretation, saying, in effect, that they could see no difference between
Congress' use of the words "allowable" and "allowed"; therefore, the statute
must be interpreted as precluding application of the tax benefit rule to
"allowed" deductions. On this questionable24 theory, the majority fashioned
a decision which technically is reconcilable with the Dobsonu. decision.
determine whether the tax benefit rule should be applied is based solely on the words
"proper adjustment." The words "properly chargeable" refer only to the kinds of de-
ductions for which adjustment must be made [see examples of "properly chargeable"
items in U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.113(b) (1)-1 (1943)]; whereas "proper adjustment"
refers to the method of adjustment. Application of the tax benefit rule obviously in-
volves a method of adjustment, not a type of deduction.
2OItalics added. Why paragraph (B), though formerly requiring adjustment only to
the extent of depreciation "allowable," was amended in 1932 to require adjustment
to the full extent "allowed," if that be greater, is not pertinent here. For full explana-
tion of the reason behind the amendment, see Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319
U. S. 523, 526, 63 Sup. Ct. 1260, 1262, and n. 7; SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932) 29; H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 22; see also Note (1940)
40 COL. L. Rv. 540.
21The policy is against allowing taxpayers to gain unwarranted advantage by accumu-
lating depreciation for use in a year in which it will bring the most tax benefit. This
policy is recognized as outweighing considerations in favor of the tax benefit rule by
both the majority and dissenting opinions in the Virginian Hotel case. 319 U. S. at
525 and 529, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1262 and1 1263.22See Hardwick Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 29 F. (2d) 498, (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert.
dismistsed on mot., 279 U. S. 876, 49 Sup. Ct. 344 (1928) ; American Nat'l Realty Co.,
47 B. T. A. 653 (1942), aff'd, 136 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); cf. United States
v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 47 Sup. Ct. 608 (1927).
2 3 See MONTGOMERY, loc. cit. mpra note 14.
2The majority seemed to reach their decision in the belief that the policy considera-
tion, discussed in note 21 mpra, which prevents the application of the tax benefit rule to
the making of adjustments for deductions "allowable" also militates against the appli-
cation of the rule to excessive deductions "allowed." But, as Chief Justice Stone stated
in his dissent [319 U. S. at 529, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1263], the objective of the policy
would appear to be fully satisfied by requiring adjustment to be made only to the
extent of depreciation "allowable."
The majority decision aroused much criticism, and Congress was petitioned by the
American Bar Association to adopt corrective legislation in the form of the tax benefit
rule. MONTGOMERY, lOc. cit. supra note 14; Plumb, op. cit. supra note 6, at 148, n. 80.
The Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Institute of Accountants advo-
cated similar legislation [(1942) 73 J. ACCOUNTANCY 486, 490], as did the United States
Chamber of Commerce [Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on
Revenue Revision of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (unrev. printing 1943) 631-6323. But
Congress, on Feb. 25, 1944, passed the Revenue Act of 1943 without adopting any of
the legislation suggested.
1944]
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Even this highly technical argument, which appears to be the sole basis for
the majority's contention that the statute lays down a fixed rule as to "al-
lowed" deductions, is not available to the minority in support of its contention
that the statute should be interpreted as affirmatively prescribing the applica-
tion of the tax benefit principle as a fixed statutory rule. For while the
similarity between the words "allowed" and "allowable" lends support to
ihe majority's position, it militates against the minority's position. The basis
of the minority's opinion is not that the statute clearly indicates the proper
rule, but that it would be "inequitable" 25 not to interpret it as applying the
tax benefit rule. While this result is more desirable than that reached by
the majority, it does not seem consistent with the rule of the Dobson case.
Surely the applicability of the tax, benefit rule wa*s no less a question of tax
accounting in the Virginian Hotel case than in the Dobson case. And the
statute was no more explicit on this question in the one case than in the
other. What greater justification, then, was there for the exercise of judicial
review and indulgence in statutory interpretation in the Virginian case than
in the Dobson case?
If courts are allowed to construe statutes as prescribing fixed rules of
accounting where such rules are not expressed or clearly implied, the bar
to judicial review, set up by the Dobson decision for application in cases
where the pertinent statute does not contain a fixed rule, will be easily
avoided by the obvious device of reading into such statutes a fixed rule,
just as the minority and majority have done in the Virginian case. In this
light the position taken by all nine justices in the Virginian case appears
inconsistent, at least in spirit, with their later position in the Dobson case.
III .
In view of this inconsistency and in view of the unprecedented extent to
which the Supreme Court in the Dobsonm case denied its own right to even
question rulings of the Tax Court in tax accounting problems, it seemed
reasonable to assume that the highest Court eventually would break away
from its Dobson decision. But the rapidity with which this break came was
stunning. Although the Dobson doctrine was applied by the Court in the
next case to come before it involving a tax accounting question, 26 barely two
months after its enunciation the doctrine seems to have been disregarded in
Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner.27 There the- taxpayer, vendor
25319 U. S. at 529, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1263.
26Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Comm'r, 320 U. S. 517, 64 Sup. Ct. 364 (1944). The
question was whether a processing tax incurred in a certain year, payment of which
was contested and liability for which was contingent upon the outcome of the contest,
was properly deductible in the year incurred, by a taxpayer accounting on the accrual
basis. Held, no.
For present state of law on deductions taken for taxes later ruled unconstitutional,
see Revenue Act of 1942 § 157, adding INT. REv. CODE § 127; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.128-1 (1943). This new statute did not apply to the years involved in the Dixie
Phw case.
27321 U. S. 281, 64 Sup. Ct. 596 (1944).
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of a product subject to a processing tax, added the amount of the tax to
the sale price. The tax was contested by taxpayer, never paid, and a year
later held unconstitutional. In subsequent years taxpayer made refunds to
its customers to the extent the sale price had been increased in prior years
by the unconstitutional tax. Taxpayer, whose accounting was on an accrual
basis, sought to account for the deductible refunds by taking a deduction in
the year the excess amounts were originally collected and included in income,
rather than in the year the refunds were actually made. It should be recog-
nized that this case is distinguishable on its facts from the Dobson case in
that it does not involve the tax benefit rule; but it must be remembered that
the Dobson decision is expressly stated not to be a tax benefit decision.2 8
The Tax Court upheld taxpayer's method of accounting in the Security
case. The Supreme Court, in refusing to accept the method of tax accounting
adopted by the Tax Court, purported to distinguish the Dobson decision on
the ground that the question in the Security case was not whether the Tax
Court had made a determination of fact, but whether, as a matter of law,
the Tax Court had misconstrued the extent of power conferred by the
statute in issue.
Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in a one-sentence
memorandum, being "of opinion that the case is governed by Dobson v.
Commissioner,"2 9 but giving no supporting reasons. Presumably they had
in mind the following, written by Justice Jackson himself, in the Dobson
decision:
Whatever latitude exists in resolving questions such as those of proper
accounting, treating a series of transactions as one for tax purposes, or
treating apparently separate ones as single in their tax consequences,
exists in the Tax Court and not in the regular courts .... 30
Against this setting, examine the words of Mr. Justice Roberts in the
Security decision:
In short, the petitioner's position is that the Commissioner and the
Board of Tax Appeals are authorized and required to make exceptions
to the general rule of accounting by annual periods wherever, upon
analysis of any transaction, it is found that it would be unjust or unfair
not to isolate the transaction and treat it on the basis of the long term
result. We think the position is not maintainable .... 31 We are of
opinion that the purpose of the language which Congress used was not
to substitute, whenever in the discretion of an administrative officer or
tribunal such a course would seem proper, a . . . [different] method of
accounting .... 32
Mr. Jnstice Roberts did purport to distinguish, the Dobso. case. But one
28See text at note 8 supra.
29321 U. S. at 287, 64 Sup. Ct. at 599.
30320 U. S. at 501-502, 64 Sup. Ct. at 247.
31321 U. S. at 285, 64 Sup. Ct. at 598.
32Id. at 287, 64 Sup. Ct. at 599.
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might voice reasonable doubts as to whether the above quoted pronounce-
ments are distinguishable.
If the Security Flour Mills case left any doubts as to how closely the
Supreme Court would adhere to the Dobson decision, these doubts were
recently put to rest by the Supreme Court's decision in Douglas v. Com-
mtissioner.33 Decided less than five months after the Dobson case, the Douglas
case seems to represent, far more clearly than the Security Flour Mills case,
a major break by the Court with its Dobson decision.
Involved in the Douglas case was a legislatively authorized Treasury regu-
lation,34 requiring that an amount equal to deductions allowed in a prior
year for depletionmust be added to taxable income in a later year, upon the
occurrence of a certain contingency in that later year. One of the issues in
the case was whether the tax benefit rule could be injected into the above
regulation, so as to excuse the addition to income in the later year of an
amount representing a deduction which did n9t offset taxable income in the
prior year. As in the Dobson and Virgian Hotel cases, supra, the
relevant statute or regulation contairied no provision as to the permissi-
bility of applying the tax benefit rule. The Board of Tax Appeals
decided to apply the tax benefit rule,3' and it is most significant that it
did so.on the authority of its own prior decision in the Dobson case. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the same court that had
passed upon and reversed the Board's ruling in the Dobson case,36 again
reversed the Board, on the same grounds, in the Douglas case;37 it too relied
exclusively on its own previous ruling in the Dobson case. The Supreme
Court, by virtue of an equally divided court,38 affirmed the circuit court.
It was expressly recognized that the Douglas case involved "an issue similar
3312 U. S. L. WEI< 4385 (May 15, 1944). D, one of the owners of an iron mine,
leased it to an operating company, said company to pay minimum royalties annually
in advance of extraction of the ore, which royalties were to be applied to ore mined
later. The royalties were reported as income in the years received, and appropriate
deductions for depletion were taken in the same years. D received no tax benefit from
the deduction in 1933. When the lease terminated years later, none of the ore had been
extracted. In the year of termination; the Commissioner, pursuant to the applicable
Regulations, infra note 34, included in the gross income of D a sum equal to the aggre-
gate amount of all deductions taken, including the 1933 tax-benefit-less deduction. Tax-
payer protested, and suit was brought.
34U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. ?3(m)-10(b) and (c), relating to I.R. C. § 23(m).
As applied to the facts of the Douglas case, supra note 33, the regulation provides that
where the 'owner of a mine has leased it to another, with the requirement that the
lessee shall pay annual royalties in advance of extraction of the ore, the owner is
allowed totake deductions for depletion to offset the royalty payments; but if the
lease terminates before the ore which has been paid for in advance has been extracted,
the lessor must report as income for the year of termination an amount equal to prior
dcductions taken on account of ore paid for but not removed.35Estate of Chas. H. Robinson, 46 B. T.,A. 943 (1942).
36Harwick v. Comm'r, 133 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), rev'g Estate of Collins,
46 B. T. A. 765 (1942). (The Dobson. case bore different titles in the courts below.)37Douglas v. Comm'r, 134 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).380nly eight justices participated in the consideration and decision of the case, Mr.
Justice Jackson being the non-participant.
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to that involved in Dobsot. v. Coninisioner."39 Nevertheless, of the six jus-
tices to consider the question, 40 four reached a result which appears to be
thoroughly antagonistic to the result of the Dobson decision, in that they
rejected the Board's application of the tax benefit rule, rather than according
to it the finality which the Dobson decision would seem to require.
Despite their recognition of the similarity of the Douglas and Dobson cases,
the justices voting for affirmance unfortunately did not explaifh or justify
the strikingly opposed holdings in these two cases. The present state of the
law is therefore uncertain. The Court has not yet said that the Dobson case
has been overturned. But in view of its inconsistency with the earlier Vir-
ginian Hotel decision, andthe Court's apparent disregard of it in the later
Security Flour Mills and Douglas cases, it is now doubtful to what extent
the profession can safely .rely on the Dobson case.
Alvin D. Lurie
3912 U. S. L. WEEK at 4385.
4OAlthough four justices voted to uphold the circuit court on the tax benefit point, and
four voted to reverse, two of the latter group based their decision on other grounds
which made it unnecessary to consider the tax benefit point; this fact, together with
the non-participation of Mr. Justice Jackson in the decision left only six justices who
had to decide the problem.
STUDENT NOTES
Arbitration: Contracts: Recent developments in the law of arbitration
in New York.-What has been the affect of the war on arbitration con-
tracts? One might expect the answer to be characterized by the role that
arbitration has played in the 'settling of disputes arising out of government
war contracts. Such, however, is not the case; not because arbitration is
unable to meet the task, but rather owing to the government's strict prohibi-
tion against such clauses in its war contracts.1
The war has not been without its contributions, however, to the develop-
ment of the arbitration law of New York. Price ceilings, priority regula-
tions, and similar governmental orders have brought more than one arbitra-
tion case before the New York courts. In the main, these decisions can be
classified into three groups: (1) where the contract containing the arbitra-
tion clause was made before the order, (2) where the contract was made
afterwards, and (3) where the order did not apply to the subject matter of
the contract as such, but rather to the acquisition of an excess inventory of
that subject matter.
The first group is exemplified by the leading case of Matter of Kramer &
Ucihitelle, I1C.2 Here the contract contained an arbitration clause as well
as a sale price which was above a subsequently established O.P.A. ceiling.
The court in a 5-2-decision held that by act of government there was a
complete frustration of performance excusing the seller and rendering the
arbitration provision inoperative.
Within the second class is Matter of Kahn & Feldman.3 In this case a
written contract for the sale of raw silk was dated July 25, 1941, but was
not actually executed by the parties until July 28th. On July 26th the
Office of Production Management prohibited such deliveries unless author-
ized by the Director of Priorities. A motion to permanently enjoin the other
party from proceeding to arbitration was granted,, the court holding that
the contract was invalid at ito inception and the arbitration provision unen-
forceable.
The following set of facts exemplifies the third group: A buyer claimed
that to take goods would force him to have an exces$ inventory in viola-
tion of a priority regulation. In granting the plaintiff's motion to proceed
to arbitration, the court said that since the defendant could assign the con-
tract or make an application to the Director of Priorities to enable himself
to accept deliveries, the arbitration provision should be enforced.4
Exclusive of the so-called war decisions, recent years have been marked
1C. C. H. WAR LAW SERVICE, Government Contracts, Vol. II, p. 24, 742, § 25, 255.
Comment (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 458.2288 N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. (2d) 493, 141 A. L. R. 1497 (1942). Accord: Sanders v.
Lowenstein, 289 N. Y. 702, 45 N. E. (2d) 457(1942).
3290 N. Y. 781, 50 N. E. (2d) 107 (1943).4Federated Textiles, Inc. v. Glamour Girl, Inc., 265 App. Div. 252, 38 N. Y. S. (2d)
493 (1st Dep't 1942). Where the Chief Price Attorney interpreted the regulation as
not applicable to the contract in question, a motion to proceed to arbitration was
granted. Matter of Frankle, 180 Misc. 88, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 566 (1943).
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by the general expansion, interpretation, and application of the arbitration
principles both under statutes and common law. The arbitration statutes
incorporated in 1937 in Article 84 of the Civil Practice Act have undergone
but two changes within recent years. Both of these were additions to sec-
tion 1448: one validates labor arbitration,5 which is beyond the scope of
this survey; and the other allows arbitration agreements upon questions which
arise "out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may be
collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between the
parties."' This clarifies the law and overcomes the effect of the Fletcher
case, 7 wherein the court refused to appoint an arbitrator for the purpose
of evaluating stock, holding that the question of appraisals and evalua-
tions did not involve "a controversy" and that the arbitration statute applied
only in cases concerning "questions of ultimate liability." As this amend-
ment was not effective when the recent case of Stern v. Ster s8 was decided
(which followed the Fletcher case), it would seem that now the amount
of support due a wife under a separation agreement can be made the sub-
ject of arbitration.9
Arbitration, having originated at common law, still retains many of the
common law principles, despite the enactment of statutes. The courts have
held that the purpose of these statutes was not to abrogate the common law,
but merely to provide a more effective remedy; in other words, the statutory
remedy is cumulative rather 'than exclusive.10 Consequently, submission to
arbitration may be made as at common law notwithstanding statutory pro-
visions."' Under the federal statute,' 2 too, which so closely resembles New
York's,' 3 it would seem that recourse can be had to common-law arbitration
should the parties so desire.
Typical of recent decisions in accord with this principle is Matter of
Friedheim v. International Paper Co.14 A controversy having arisen, under
5Paragraph added, L. 1940, c. 851.
6Paragraph added, L. 1941, c. 288.7Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N. E. 248 (1924).
8285 N. Y. 239, 33 N. E. (2d) 689, 133 A. L. R. 1332 (1941).
9Generally, matters involving property rights and pecuniary claims arising in matri-
monial matters may be arbitrated in New York. Note (1939) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv.
626. The custody, support, and rights of visitation of children are not properly the subject
of arbitration. Waltman v. Waltman, N. Y. L. J. Jan. 15, 1940, p. 221 (Sup. Ct.).
106 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 1919. Rosen-
baum v. Drucker, 346 Pa. 434, 31 A. (2d) 117 (1943).
lNew York Lumber & Wood-Working Co. v. Schneider, 119 N. Y. 475, 24 N. E. 4
(1890) ; Hinkle v. Zimmerman, 184 N. Y. 114, 76 N. E. 1080 (1906) ; Hano v. Isaac
Blanchard Co., 199 N. Y. Supp. 227 (1922). For other authorities see 6 WILLISTOI,
op. cit. supra note 10, at § 1919.
1243 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. (1940). Whether the parties subjected themselves
to the Federal Arbitration Act or New York's is a question of intention. Matter of
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 389 (1929); French
v. Petrinovic, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 846 (City Court of New York 1944).
13Cohen and Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law (1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 265;
Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statutes (1936) 36 YALE L. J. 667.
14265 App. Div. 601, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 144 (1st Dep't f943).
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the usual arbitration clause,, it was submitted to arbitrators who made an
award. On motion to' the supreme court this. award was vacated because
of alleged error in the findings by the arbitrator. The appellate division, in
reversing, sustained the well-established common law rule that an award
may not be impeached because of error of the arbitrators as to the law
or facts in the absence of fraud, corruption, or other misconduct.' 5 Likewise,
an award which failed to comply with the statutory requirements because
of lack of an acknowledgement was still enforced as a common law award.'
6
The question of the existence of a contract of arbitration has been fre-
quently litigated. The arbittation agreement must, of course, be founded
upon a valid, existing contract.-7 In New York the issue of the "making of
the contract" or the "failure to comply therewith" has been held to be a
subject for the court to determine and not the arbitrators.' 8 Thus, when a
seller attempted to impose arbitration by stamping a provision therefor on
invoices sent after the goods had been delivered, and arbitration had not
been previously discussed between the contracting parties, it was held not
to constitute an arbitration agreement.' Should the validity of the arbitra-
tion provision turn upon the question of the authority of the person signing
the contract, that becomes an issue of fact concerning the existence of the
contract and is for the court to determine.2 0 Another instance is furnished
by Matter of Lipnan v. Haueser Shellac Co, 21 where the seller alleged can-
cellation by agreement. The contract called for the settlement by arbitration
of "all controversies in connection with and/or arising out of this con-
tract." On motion of the buyers assignee2 the court compelled the seller to
15Matter of Wilkins, 169 N. Y. 494, 62 N. E. 575 (1902) ; Matter of Pine St.
Realty Co., Inc., 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1931); Matter
of Shirley Sillq Co., 257 App. Div. 375, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 309 (1st Dep't 1939); Delma
Engineering Corp. v. J. A. Johnson, - App. Div. -, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (1st Dep't
1944).
16Matter of Widder Bros., Inc., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 13, 1941, p. 1477 (Sup. Ct.).
Where there's a clear intention to have a statutory arbitration, but a failure to meet
the statutory requirements, the entire proceeding may be a nullity. Electric Steel
Elev. Co. v. Kam Malting Co., 112 App. Div. 686, 98 N. Y. Supp. 604 (4th Dep't 1906).17Metro Plan, Inc. v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N, Y. S. (2d) 35 (1st Dep't
1939); Application of Gruen, 173 Misc. 756, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 990 (1940), aff'd, 259
App. Div. 712, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 1023 (1st Dep't 1940) (issue of duress); Matter
of Frankle, 180 Misc. 88, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 566 (1943) ; 6 WMLISTOZr, op. Cit. supra
note 10, at § 1920.
'
8 See C. P. A. § 1450. Matter of Kahn, 284 N. Y. 515, 32 N. E. (2d) 534 (1940);
Matter of Aqua Mfg. Co., Inc., ,179 Misc. 949, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 564 (1943), aft'd,
266 App. Div. 714, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 935 (3d Dep't 1943).
l9Tannenbaum Textile Co., Inc. v. Schlanger, 287 N. Y. 400, 40 N., E. (2d) 225
(1942), noted (1942)' 27 CORNELL L. Q. 558. I20N. Y. Mfg. Corp. v, International Looms, Inc., N. Y. L. J., July 23, 1943, p. 161
(Sup. Ct.). There is no implied authority for a wife to bind her husband to an ar-
bitration agreement. Barrett Nephews & Co. v. Gerst, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 15, 1942,
p. 214 (Sup. Ct.).
21289 N. Y. 76, '43 N. E. (2d) 817 (1942).
22An assignee may avail himself of an arbitration clause. Lipmann v. Haeuser Shellac
Co., 289 N. Y. 76, 43 N. E. (2d) 817 (1942) ; Sanders v. Lowenstein, 289 N. Y. p02,
45 N. E. (2d) 457 (1942).
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proceed to arbitration, holding that all acts of the parties subsequent to the
making of the contract which raised issues of fact or law were for the
arbitrators.
Also presented in this type of case is the problem of the severability of
the arbitration agreement from the main contract. American courts, gen-
erally speaking, do not conceive of the arbitration provision as a separate
entity creating independent rights and duties except in two cases: where
the substantive contract failed to comply with the Statute of Frauds, and
where there is an attempted rescission of the main contract by one party.2
In all other instances the arbitration agreement is either terminated or
treated as never having come into existence.2 4
Recent cases have allowed the subject matters of arbitration agreements
to range from tort claims2 5 to specific performance actions 26 Frequently,
these, agreements will contain a condition precedent to arbitration, and
such clauses are rigidly enforced.2 7
Jurisdictional difficulties of the arbitration committees would appear over-
come, as the leading case of Gilbert v. Bernstine28 has been consistently
followed. Here there was an agreement to arbitrate "at London pursuant to
the arbitration Law of Great Britain." When differences arose, a notice
of the arbitration proceeding in London was served; when defendant failed
to appear, an award was made there against him. The plaintiff subsequently
sued for the amount of the award in New York and the Court of Appeals
held that a good cause of action was stated. Again in the recent case of
Mulcahy v. Whitehil 29 a contract was made with a Massachusetts resident
providing for the settlement of disputes in New York, in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, upon demand of either
party. A notice was served by mail on the Massachusetts defendant, and
when he failed to appear an award was made against him. The Supreme
Court of New York having confirmed the award, 30 suit was instituted in
236 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 1920; Comment (1943) 43 COL. L. REv.
508.
246 W LisTo x, op. cit. mcpra note 10, at ,§ 1920; Comment (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 508.
25Matter of Rosenberg, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 6, 1943, p. 906 (Sup. Ct.) (Tort claims) ;
Application of Tully, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 638 (1940), affd, 260 App. Div. 937, 24
N. Y. S. (2d) 727 (2d Dep't 1940) (attorney's fees); Parry v. Bache, 125 F. (2d)
493 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) (stock subscription agreements under the U. S. Arbitration
Act).26Matter of Freydberg Bros., Inc. v. Corey, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 30, 1941, p. 1289 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 805, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 129 (1st Dep't 1941).27Filling claims before preceding to arbitration: Matter of Caudwell Wingate Co.,
Inc., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 20, 1940, p. 2134 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 262 App. Div. 829, 28 N. Y. S.(2d) 763 (1st Dep't 1941), appeal denied, 262 App. Div. 994, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 806 (1st
Dep't 1941).
28255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706, 73 A. L..R. 1453 (1931).
2848 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1943).30For one year after the award an application may be made to the court having
jurisdiction, upon notice to adversary, for an order confirming the award. C. P. A. §
1461. Once confirmed, it has the same effect as a judgment. Ibid.
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the Massachusetts District Court to enforce the award, which after con-
firmation had the effect of a judgment. In allowing recovery," the court
said, that his unqualified submission of disputes to arbitration necessarily
implied a submission to the rules of procedure of the American Arbitration
Association and to the law of New York covering such arbitration. This
case is but one of the latest in a long series which would seem to settle
the question of the enforcibility of such awards.31
The varied web of the procedural aspects of arbitration is too
closely knit to be examined at any length herein. Of considerable im-
portance, however, is the waiving of the arbitration provision, which may
occur in, one of many ways. Probably the most common is by failure
to set forth the arbitration clause in an answer to a civil suit.32 An action
begun by a warrant of attachment constitutes a waiver by that party
of the arbitration provision, and similarly, the question of the validity of
the contract may be waived by proceedings before the arbitrator and the
parties may be estopped from asserting lack of authority.34 The weight to
be given to evidence is for the arbitrators to determine; and a court is
precluded, from opening the record and passing upon the judgment,35 though
exclusion of evidence may be the basis for a court review.3 6 As mentioned
before, under the statutes the final award must be confirmed by the court
and an acknowledgement by the arbitrators is a prerequisite to such con-
firmation,' 7 although, where this is lacking due to inadvertance, it may be
corrected.38 Before being approved by the court, the award has the same
status as a verdict of a jury, 9 and once approved, may be enforced as any
other judgment.
Occasionally the question has arisen as to who may act as an arbitrator.
In MacFadden v. Binvenga 0 it was said that a supreme court justice may
31Coudenhove-Kalergi v. Dieterle, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 313 (1942) (German award)
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 77 (1) (d) ; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) §
81.1.32Matter of Haupt v. Rose, 265 N. Y. 108, 191 N. E. 853 (1934) ; Nagy v. Areas
Brass & Iron Co., Inc., 242 N. Y. 97, 150 N. E. 614 (1926); Short v. National
Sport Fashions, Inc., 264 App. Div. 284, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 169 (1st Dep't 1942) ; Mat-
ter of Dandy Dress, Inc., 179 Misc. 36, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 449 (1st Dep't 1942).33McKinney v. McKinney, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 9, 1943, p. 485 (Sup. Ct.).
34Matter of Fine, 263 App. Div. 797, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 113 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd,
287 N. Y. 843, 41 N. E. (2d) 170 (1942).35Matter of John Kelly, Ltd., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 1, 1943, p. 433 (Sup. Ct.).
36Matter of Ashbes, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 3, 1943, p. 451 (Sup. Ct.).37
"To entitle the award to be enforced . . . it must be in writing: and ... subscribed
by the arbitrators making it; acknowledged or proved, and certified in like manner
as a deed to be recorded . . ." C. P. A. § 1460. Sanford Laundry, Inc. v. Simon, 285
N. Y. 488, 35 N. E. (2d) 182 (1941).3S8Matter of Verly Building Corp., 264 Div. 885, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 891 (2d Dep't
1942).39Matter of Fine, 263 App. Div. 797, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 113 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd.
287 N. Y. 843, 41 N. E. (2d) 170 (1942).
40290 N. Y. 568, 48 N. E. (2d) 166 (1943). It'was here pointed out that Article 6,
Section 19 of the New York Constitution provides that a judge of the Court of Appeals
and a justice of the supreme court shall not practice as attorney or counselor in any
court of record' nor act as referee in any action or proceeding.
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not act as an arbitrator in a matthr pending before him. Should the arbitra-
tor be disqualified, 41 the entire award, order, and judgment entered thereon
will be vacated and set aside. The arbitrators have authority to determine
who shall pay the fees of arbitration, unless it is otherwise expressly pro-
vided in the submission or contract.42
This survey of recent decisions would seem to indicate that the courts
are fostering a gradual expansion of arbitration principles subject to a
vigilant guidance.
Donald P. Yust
Conflict of laws: Taxation: Power of state of owner's domicile to tax
property which is taxed elsewhere under the "unit rule."-Northwest
Airlines is a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business at
St. Paul. It operates its planes over seven states, and makes regularly
scheduled landings in five. It owns or leases hangars and office space at each
stopping-place. Its principal service and repair station is located at St. Paul,
but it also has maintenance bases in four states besides Minnesota. St. Paul
is registered with the Civil Aeronautics Authority as the home port of all
of Northwest's planes. During 1939, only 16% of the total mileage covered
by Northwest's planes was flown in Minnesota, but each of the planes was
in the state at some time during the year.
Northwest computed its Minnesota personal property tax for 1939 on
the basis of the number of planes within the state on May 1, the statutory
tax assessment day. The state authorities assessed a deficiency tax against
Northwest, claiming the right to tax all planes owned by the airline at
their full value.' The Supreme Court of Minnesota, with three judges dis-
senting, upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of the state.2 The U. S.
41This may be brought about in one of many ways: passing judgment on his own
claim rIn re Miller, 260 App. Div. 444, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 120 (1st Dep't 1940)];
failure to disclose interest FShirley Silk Co., Inc. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 260
App. Div. 572, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 254 (1st Dep't 1940)]; partiality [Goldens Bridge
- Colony, Inc. v. Cooper, 265 App. Div. 857, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 665 (2d Dep't 1942)].
-
2C. P. A. § 1457; Bernstein v. Perlmutter, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 95 (1942).
'The state based its claim on MiNN. STAT. (1941) § 272.01, which declares that
"all real and personal property in this state, and all personal property of persons
residing therein, including the property of corporations . . . is taxable. . . ." The
language used in the majority opinion indicates that the Court considered Northwest's
planes to be "property in this state," and therefore taxable under this statute even
without the provision for taxation of "all personal property of persons residing there-
in." Several other states have statutes purporting to tax all property within the state.
See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE (Deering, 1939) § 201; GA. CODE ANN. (1937) § 92-101;
ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1940) c. 120, § 499; MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson,
1935) § 7.1; Mo. Rav. STAT. (1939) § 10,936; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) § 54:4-1;
TEx. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1939) art. 7145.7503, 5061. OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page,
1938) § 5328 specifically taxes "aircraft belonging to persons residing in this state
and not used in business wholly in another state."2Sta.te v. Northwest Air Lines, 213 Minn. 395, 7 N. W. (2d) 691 (1942), noted
(1943) 56 HARV. L. Rv. 1011, 38 ILL. L. Rav. 210, 29 VA. L. Ray. 958-
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Supreme Court granted certiorari,3 and, after argument, affirmed the judg-
ment of the state courts. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, - U. S.
--, 64 Sup. Ct. 950, 12 U. S. L. Week 4370 (U. S. 1944). Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice Jackson wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Chief Justice Stone
wrote a dissent in which Justices Roberts, Reed and Rutledge joined.
Traditionally, property both movable and immovable is taxable by the
political subdivision wherein it has its "situs,"14 and with respect to corporeal
wealth, as in the present case, the situs is real. The property actually
occupies space at a point which can be located. This rule is not without
its reason, since the jurisdiction where property is used and located ordi-
narily furnishes protection and other benefits for which it is entitled to
compensation.5 But "situs" is a legal term, and the situs of even tangible
property is frequently difficult to determine, since a movable is seldom sta-
tionary in character and may easily be removed from one jurisdiction to
another. This difficulty early gave rise to the doctrine nwbilia sequitntur
personam, which, simply state, is a presumption that the situs of all per-
sonalty for tax purposes is the domicile of its owner.6 This presumption
may be rebutted by proof that the property has acquired a permanent loca-
tion in a jurisdiction other than that of the owner's domicile.7 Where a
permanent location has been acquired, the place of situs is given sole juris-
diction to tax, and the place of the owner's domicile is excluded.8
Neither the concept of situs nor the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personaun
is adequate when applied to property composed of a number of shifting
units some of which can be found at any time in each jurisdiction where
the owner carries on business, but none of which is permanently located
in any jurisdiction. In Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pen.nsylvania,9 the Court
held that property of this kind (in this case, railroad cars) could be assessed
by each jurisdiction in which the units were regularly present on the basis
of the average number of units within the jurisdiction during the tax year.
This rule was a practical compromise, since it allowed each state visited
by the itinerant property to levy a tax in return for the protection and other
benefits which the property received there, and at the same time it pro-
tected property employed in interstate commerce from the burdens of double
taxation. However, it was a rule based upon a fiction, since it attributed
situs to an average (which is only a mathematical concept incapable of
3319 U. S. 734, 63 Sup. Ct. 1157 (1943).4McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 429 (U. S. 1819); BEALE, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1935) § 118C.8.5Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HALv. L. REV. 587. Cf. HARDING, DOUBLE
TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933) 22-27.6 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) 533-541.7As expounded by Story, the presumption is conclusive and irrebuttable. Story's
view has not been followed, however, by either courts or commentators in this country.
The prevailing view seems to be that situs is governed primarily by the physical loca-
tion of the chattel, and the doctrine -nobilia sequuntur is invoked only when necessary
to the attainment of a just result. See In re Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 973,
984 (S. D. W. Va. 1941); Beale, The Situs of Things (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 525.8Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905).
9141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876 (1891).
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
having any location) in spite of the fact that situs could be attributed to
none of the units of property from which the average was calculated.' 0
The "unit rule" of taxation set forth in Pull-man's Palace Car Co. v. Penn-
slvani l has been applied to buses' 2 and trucks'3 moving interstate, but
never to steamships.14 It has been held that vessels are not taxable at ports
of call15 but only at the home port16 or at the domicile of the "owner.1 7
Under the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam the state of the owner's
domicile is allowed to tax at its full value property composed of shifting
units all of which are frequently outside the state, where their absences are-
in the nature of mere random excursions such that a taxable average is
never present in another jurisdiction.' 8  Likewise, the state of the owner's
domicile is permitted to tax at its full value property composed of units
none of which have ever been in the taxing state, where they have not
acquired a taxable situs elsewhere.' 9 The presumption that the situs of
personalty is identical with the domicile of its owner holds good in the
absence of proof that the property has acquired a situs in another jurisdic-
tion. But the Supreme Court had never decided whether the fictional situs
attributed to the average number of a quantity of shifting units 'in states
other than the state of the owner's domicile was so far equivalent to actual
situs that the state of domicile could tax only the proportion of the property
which was not taxable under the unit rule in the other states. That question
was presented by the principal case, and the Court answered it by allowing
the state of the owner's domicile to tax the property at its full value.
In reaching this result the Court relied heavily on the doctrine mobilia
sequ1tutur persanam. 'It is true that the majority opinion emphasized the
fact that Minnesota was not only the domicile of the corporation but also
'OThe fictitious nature of the assumption is illustrated by the fact that statutes pur-
porting to tax "all property within the state" have been held ineffective to subject an
average of shifting units to taxation. The jurisdiction may tax only if it has a statute ,
specifically making such property taxable, and providing a method of valuation and
assessment. Queen City Brewing Co. v. District of Columbia, 134 F. (2d) 44 (App.
D. C. 1943); Tamble v. Pullman Co., 173 Fed. 200 (C. C. M. D, Tenn. 1909) ; State
v. Union Tank Car Co., 151 Miss. 797, 119 So. 310 (1928); Lewis & Holmes Motor
Freight Corp. v. Atlanta, 195 Ga. 810, 25 S. E. (2d) 699 (1943). Contra: Union Tank
Car Co. v. McKnight, 84 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; People v. Wilson Car Lines,
Inc., 369 Ill. 294, 16 N. E. (2d) 752 (1938).
1141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876 (1891).
12 State Tax Commission v. Central Greyhound Lines, 252 Ky. 300, 67 S. W. (2d)
35 (1934).
1 3Lewis & Holmes Motor Freight Corp. v. Atlanta, 195 Ga. 810, 25 S. E. (2d) 699
(1943).
14Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 245, 251.
15Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1855); St. Louis v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U. S. 1871).
16 Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1855).
17Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 26 Sup. Ct. 679 (1906); Callen-
der Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 61 Ore. 343, 122 Pac. 758 (1912).
'
8 New York Central & H. R. R.R. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, 26 Sup. Ct. 714 (1905).
19 Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct. 13 (1911) ; State v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 56 Nev. 38, 43 P. (2d) 173 (1935).
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the home base of its fleet of planes. However, the Court had previously
declared in Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoza2° that a state not the
domicile of the owner could not tax a fleet of tank cars at their full value
although the taxing state was the base of operations for the entire fleet.
Since the majority did not overrule the Johnson case, it seems safe to assume
that the decisive factor which rendered the planes taxable at their full value
in the principal case was the fact that the taxing state was the place of the
corporation's domicile.
The principal case appears to undermine the authority of Pidlinan's Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,21 since it repudiates by implication the doctrine of
fictional situs upon which the unit theory depends. The Court indicates that
the right of the state of the owner's domicile to tax could be cut off only
by the acquisition by the property of an "actual" situs outside the state-
that is, by its continuous absence from the state during the tax year. How-
ever, the Court's holding, on this point is obscured by its reliance on New
York Central R.R. v. Miller.2 2 In that case, the state of the owner's domi-
cile was permitted to tax property composed of a number of shifting units
at its full value; but there, no conflict existed between the fictional situs
theory and the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam, since the court was
free to assume that the excursions of the units from the state of the owner's
domicile were so random and irregular that it was impossible to estimate
the average number present in other states. That being true, the unit rule
could not be employed to attribute a fictional situs to an average number of
cars outside the state of the owner's domicile. It is difficult for the Court
to make a similar assumption in the principal case, since, as Mr. Chief
Justice Stone points out in his dissent, six of the seven states over which
Northwest operates its planes had assessed and collected taxes in accord-
ance with the unit theory.
Mr. Justice Jackson reached the same result as the majority, but by a
path of somewhat less resistance. He took the view that airplanes resemble
ships more than railroad rolling stock, and, just as ships are exempt from
taxation at ports of call, 23 so airplanes should be taxable only at their home
port. But in proposing that planes be taxed solely at their base of opera-
tions, Mr. Justice Jackson departed from his ship analogy. Although at one
time ships were taxable at the home port,24 this rule proved impracticable,
and subsequent decisions transferred the taxing power to the jurisdiction of
the owner's domicile.2 While in this case the owner's domicile and the
base of operations were the same, a situation in which this would not be
true can easily be imagined. 26
20290 U. S. 158, 54 Sup. Ct. 152 (1933).
21141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876 (1891).
22202 U. S. 584, 26 Sup Ct. 714 (1905).
23Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1855); St. Louis v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U. S. 1871).24Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1855).
25St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U. S. 1871); Ayer & Lord Tie
Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 26 Sup. Ct. 679 (1906).26See Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 54 Sup. Ct. 152 (1933).
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The decision of the majority, whatever the theory upon which it is based,
has the effect of subjecting property to multiple taxation. This is in con-
formity with several recent decisions of the Court concerning the taxation
of intangibles ;27 but hitherto this tendency had been less apparent in cases
dealing with the taxation of tangible property.28 Although it has long been
recognized that property employed in interstate commerce is not completely
exempt from state taxation,29 the Court has held that multiple taxation of
such property by the states constitutes an unpermitted burden on interstate
commerce.30  If the decision in the principal case represents a reversal of
the Court's former attitude on this question, Congressional action may be
necessary to lighten a tax burden which is perhaps greater than the inter-
state carriers should be required to bear.
Robert W. Gribben
Evidence: Lie-detectors: Discussion and Proposals.-The late Dean
Wigmore remarked in 1923, "If there ever is devised a psychological test
for the evaluation of witnesses, the law will run to meet it."1 Although
deception-detectors are now available, the few cases involving them which
have reached appellate courts show no such eagerness on the part of those
tribunals.
In 1923, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Frye v.
United States2 refused to admit testimony as to results of Marston's systolic
blood pressure test,3 reasoning that it had not yet received "such scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made." 4
27State Tax Commission of -Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1942),
noted (1942) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 74; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct.
900 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939).,
28See Sancho v. Humacao Shipping Corp., 108 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939).29 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 60 Sup. Ct. 968 (1940);
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149, 20 Sup. Ct. 631 (1900);
American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, 19 Sup. Ct. 599 (1899);
Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 127 U. S. 117, 8 Sup. Ct. 1037 (1888).
3OFisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650, 56 Sup. Ct. 608 (1936);
Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276 (1919) ; Philadelphia
Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1887).
12 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 875.
2293 Fed. 1013 (App. D. C. 1923), 34 A. L. R. 145 (1925). Notes (1924) 24 COL. L.
REV. 429, 37 HIv. L. REv. 1138, 33 YALE L. J. 771.
3 The term "lie detector" is applied to any machine for the recording of the involun-
tary physiological responses connected with conscious deception: change in pulse rate,
respiration rate, galvanic reflex, blood-pressure, and others. Earlier instruments re-
corded only one or two of these reactions., Recently, however, the polygraph, which
records all of these responses, has been accepted almost universally as the most reliable.
Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection (1939) 29 J. CRerm. L. 848, 879, n. 95; see note 50
infra. But see MacNitt, It Defense of Electroderinal Response and Cardiac Amplitude
as Measures of Deception (1942) 33 J. Cian. L. 266.
4293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (App. D. C. 1923).
1944]
CORNELL LAW,QUARTERLY[
Ten years later, the Wisconsin court in State v. Bahner5 rejected the
results of Keeler's polygraph test, on the ground that it was still in the
experimental stage, citing the Frye case as authority. 6
The New York Court of Appeals decision in People v.' Forte7 in 1938,
- has been thought by many to overrule the county court decision in People v.
Keny,8 handed down in the same year, and is usually cited as authority for
the rule that the results of lie-detector tests are inadmissible in New York.
Careful analysis of the two cases reveals that no such rule was laid down.
In People z. Kenny, the Queens County Court allowed an expert, Father
Sumnmers of Fordham University, to testify concerning the results of a
pathometer 9 test made on the defendant. It is important to note that, to lay
a predicate, the defense offered in evidence the uncontroverted testimony of
Summers as to the great accuracy 'of the machine,10 and that the prosecuting
attorney conceded the practical utility and scientific value of the technique.
His only objection was that the apparatus had not yet received general
scientific recognition," and h'is only authorities for this objection were the
Frye'2 and Bohner'13 cases, one fifteen, the- other five years before, neither
dealing with the apparatus in question. On the basis of the testimony
offered, the trial judge decided that results of the pathometer test were
admissible in evidence.
In People v. Forte,14 the Kings Cointy Court denied a motion by defend-
ant's attorney (after defendant's conviction) to allow defendant to be re-
moved to another County and subjected to Summers' test. The court refused
to admit testimony concerning the pathometer's reliability and status in the
field of criminal investigation. It decided that the apparatus had not yet
received general scientific recognition, relying solely on (1) a statement
of opinion made by Wigmore in 1937,16 and (2) a statement of opinion by
a psychology professor at Columbia University that the blood pressure test
5210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314, 86 A. L. R. 611 (1933). Notes (1933) 13 B. U. L.
REv. 321, 8 WIs. L. REv. 283, 24 J. CRim. L. 440.
6210 Wis. 651, 657, 246 N. W. 314, 317 (1933).
7279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. (2d) 31 (1938), 119 A. L. R. 1198 (1939). Notes (1939)
24 CORNELL L. Q. 434, 37 MicH. L. REv. 1141, 25 VA. L. REv. 492, 27 ILL. B. J. 308.
8167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (Co. Ct. 1938). Notes (1938) 16 CGI-KENT
L. REv. 269, 29 Y. Cami. L. 287, 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 903.9The pathometer measures the changes in the electrical conductivity of the' skin in
response to emotional stimuli.' For a complete description, see Forkosch, The Lie
Detector and the Courts (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 202, 208; Summers, Scienwe
Can Get the Confession (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REV. 334.
10167 Misc. 51, 52, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348, 349 (Co. Ct. 1938). Summers testified that
the pathometer was practically 100% accurate, basing his estimate upon over 6000 tests.
See note 33 infra.
"I1d. at 53, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348, 350.
12293 Fed. 1013 (App. D. C. 1923).
13210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
14167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (Co. Ct. 1938).
15 WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937) §§ 311-313. Wigmore, how-
ever, had approved the use of the lie-detector conditionally in 1935. WIGMORE, CODE OF
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1935) § 967.
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(not the galvanometer test) was still in an experimental stage,' and (3) an
A.L.R. annotation stating that the Frye and Bohner cases were the only
cases in which attempts have been made to introduce results of physiological
deception tests.' 7
The Kenny decision was never appealed. The Forte decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.' 8 From this affirmance ,the fallacious conclusion
is drawn that the Court of Appeals thereby overruled the Kenny decision.
The opinion of the court evinces no such intention:
We cannot take judicial notice that this instrument is or is not effec-
tive for the purpose of determining the truth .... The record is devoid
of evidence tending to show a general scientific recognition that the
pathometer possesses efficacy. Evidence relating to handwriting, finger-
printing and ballistics is recognized.by experts as possessing such value
that reasonable certainty can follow from tests. Until such a fact, if
it be a fact, is demonstrated by qualified experts in respect to the 'lie-
detector,' we cannot hold as a matter of law that error was committed
in refusing to allow defendant to experiment with it.' 9
The Kenny case and the Forte case are not opposed in principle. The
Court of Appeals in the Forte case based its refusal to admit the results of
the lie-detector'test upon a lack of testimony proving its efficacy; the court
in the Kenny case admitted the results of the test only after such testimony
had been supplied.20
Even if the holdings were directly in conflict, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is of doubtful force, since it is based upon the premise that no
evidence was offered "tending to show a general' scientific recognition that
the pathometer possessed efficacy," 21 and that therefore the court had been
asked to take judicial notice. However, both the record22 and the report of
the lower court2 show that testimony to this effect was offered and rejected
by the lower court. Therefore, in New York the admissibility of the re-
sults of a lie-detector test should still be considered a matter for the trial
judge's discretion.
In 1942, the Michigan court in People v. Becker24 refused to take judicial
notice of the lie-detector's general scientific recognition, holding that results
of lie-detector tests were properly excluded in the absence of testimony
indicating such recognition, relying upon2 5 the Frye (1923) and Bohner
16Note (1924) 24 COL. L. 1 Ev. 428, 430.
17Note (1933) 86 A. L. R. 616.
18279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. (2d) 31 (1938).
10279 N. Y. 204, 206, 18 N. E. (2d) 31, 32 (1938).2O0See Notes (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 434, (1941) 48 W. VA. L. Q. 45, (1939) 8
FORDHAm L. Rav. 354, (1942) 139 A. L. R. 1174.21The court's refusal to take judicial notice on the facts it assumed seems sound.
20 Amt. JuR. § 97.22Record on Appeal, 273-277, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. (2d) 31 (1938).
23167 Misc. 868, 873, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913, 917 (Co. Ct. 1938).
24300 Mich. 652, 2 N. W. (2d) 503, 139 A. L. R. (1942).
25d. at 565, 2 N. W. (2d) 503, 505 (indirectly by citing as their sole authority 20
Am. Jur. § 762, 633, which in turn relies upon the Frye and Bohner cases).
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(1933) cases for the proposition that the blood pressure test had not yet,
in 1942, gained sufficient scientific standing to justify its admission.
Le Fevre v. State,26 a Wisconsin decision, is the latest case to be reported.
Writers have assumed that the results of lie-detector tests would be ad-
missible if the parties, before the test was given, signed a stipulation pro-
viding that either party might use the results on the trial.2 7 In the Le Fezre
case, the court, sustaining the district attorney's objection, excluded the find-
ings and conclusions of the lie-detector expert in spite of such a stipulation
between the district attorney and the defendant. From the reported opinion,
the appellate court's approval of the lower court ruling without any attempt
to justify its stand, seems unwarranted. The record, however, discloses that
the defendant offered only the report of the lie-detector examiner whereas
the hearsay rule requires the examiner himself to testify.2 8
Excluding cases in which confessions, although partly induced by a lie-
detector test, have been admitted, 29 these six cases seem to contain the only
reported instances of attempts to offer the results of lie-detectqr tests in
evidence.30
Utilization of the Lie-Detector.-Although the reliability of witnesses is
not computable, it certainly does not approximate the reliability evidenced
by the record of lie-detectors in thousands of tests. The two leading authori-
ties in the field, Keeler and Inbau, 31 estimate that lie-detector findings are
approximately 85% accurate.3 2 Other experts make even more optimistic
reports.3 Considering that in many instances there is no opportunity to
verify the results, and that this estimate excludes those cases where the
examiner considered the results too uncertain to make a definite diagnosis,
26242 Wis. 416, 8 N. W. (2d) 288 (1943). Note [19431 Wis. L. Rsv. 430.271nbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases (1935) 2 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB.
495, 502; INBAU, LIE DETECrION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942) Z6; Jordan,
Admissibility of Deception .Tests (1938) 29 J. Clm. L. 287, 291.28For a complete discussion of this case, see Note [1943] Wis. L. REV. 430.29State v. Delhart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N. W. (2d) 360 (1943). Note [1943] Wis. L.
REv. 430; Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. (2d) 389 (1941), 139 A. L. R.
1174 (1942).; Commonwealth.v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A. (2d) 353 (1939).30 n State v. Hudson, 289 S. W. 920 (Mo. 1926), the court refused to admit testi-
mony concerning the examination of the defendant under scopolamin, commonly referred
to as "truth-serum." Note (1927) 12 ST. Louis L. R-v. 215. 'For a discussion of
various theories of deception detection, see Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection (1939)
29 J. GCim. L. 848, 30 J. CRni. L. 104.311n 1942, Inbau estimated a 10% margin of error. This estimate excluded those
cases in which, extraneous information was used in conjunction with the lie-detector
to get confessions. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942) 54.32Summers, Science Can Get the Confession (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REV. 334, 338;
Inbau, The Lie Detector (1935) 40 SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 81, 83; Keeler, Method of
Detection Deception (1930) 1 Am. J. POL. Sci. 42. See also Trovillo, Deception Test
Criteria (1943) 33 J. CaRm. L. 338, 341 (85% of records indicating guilt are subse-
quently verified as correct; only .05% prove erroneous).33Marston estimated 94.2% accuracy in 1921 [Marston, Psychological Possibilities in
the Deception Test (1921) 11 J. CRm. L. 551, 568] and over 97% accuracy in 1935
[N. Y. L. J., Oct. 5, 1935, p. 1134]. Summers claimed 99% success [Summers, Sciene
Can Get the Confession (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REV. 334, 340], but this estimate has
since been discredited as being too optimistic.
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the percentage of actual error must be well below ten percent. This excel-
lent record would seem to justify the assertion that using the results of
lie-detector tests to verify the testimony of important witnesses would be
an inestimable advance in the efficiency of the legal process. 34
Lawyers, judges and legal writers, however, are sitting back, complacently
waiting for the lie-detector to be proven infallible3 5 or for psychologists and
physiologists to "accept" it.36 Because the few authorities in the field have
failed to enlist the interest of physiologists and psychologists generally,37
the latter are neither inclined nor qualified to stamp any lie-detector with
their approval. 38
Although the law is hanging back, the lie-detector is being used to ad-
vantage in other fields. As early as 1938, an estimated one hundred police
departments,3 9 including five state police organizations, employed the lie-
detector in the investigation of crimes.4° Their enthusiastic reports are con-
vincing proof of the machine's reliability.41 For instance, the Wichita Police
Department's reports, after four thousand examinations made over a period
of three years, that in those tests where deception was indicated, 55.1% of
the subjects later confessed, and that 41.2% of the remaining 44.9% had
been successfully prosecuted in court. 42
Detective agencies, too, find the lie-detector invaluable. An official of a
large detective agency recently estimated that the lie-detector made possible
the, successful solution of ninety-nine percent of its cases where solution
was otherwise impossible. 43
The lie-detector has also been used in business. Many large department
and chain stores have adopted the practice of regularly examining employees
with. the lie-detector ;44 one of the world's largest reports that in six years
3 4 BARNES AND TEETER, NEw HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY (1943) 287. But see Peller,
Scientific Aids in Proof (1939) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 328, 336: "Science has offered
little aid in either the uncovering or uprooting of bias and the motive to lie. The only
tools available for this task are the common-law tests of credibility (physical appear-
ance and mannerisms: blushing, squinting of eyes, twitching, squirming, throat pulsa-
tions, verbosity, avoiding eyes of examiner) and . . . cross-examination."35See text at note 62 infra.36See McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence (1927) 15 CAL. L. REv.
484, 496, n. 46-48, showing the answers of 38 leading psychologists to the question of
whether the results of lie-detector tests should be used in evidence. "Not more than
seven replies could be considered as showing lack of faith in the machine" (id. at 498).
37INBAU, LE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942) 64.
3Wbid.; Jordan, Admissibility of Deception Tests in New York (1938) 29 J. CRIM.
L. 287, 290.39Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection (1939) 29 J. CRIer. L. 848, 879, n. 95;
MARSTON, THE LIE-DETECTOR TEST (1938) "Introduction"; Note (1939) 8 FORDHAM
L. REV. 122, n. 13.4 0 Marston, op. cit. supra note 39, at 20.
4 See, e.g., the reports of: Toledo Police Department [54 AM. CITY 15 (1939)];
San Antonio Police Department [3 TEX. B. J. 482 (1940)]; Michigan State Police
[15 RocKY MT. L. REV. 162 (1943)].
42161 SCIENTIFic AMERICAN 8 (1939).
43McEvoy, The Lie Detector Goes Into Business (Feb. 1941) 38 READER'S DIGEST
69, 71.
441d. at 69.
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it has thereby accounted for over ninety percent of its losses.45 Lloyd's of
London is so impressed with the record shown by the lie-detector that
insurance premiums are substantially reduced to banks wherever lie-detector
tests are given regularly.46 In Chicago, premiums on bonds covering bank
employees are reduced ten percent if the bank agrees to test its employees
every five years.47 In the thirty Chicago banks employing the polygraph
since 1931, defalcations have vanished.4 8
Although the lie-detector is yet to be sanctioned by an appellate court,
trial judges the country over, convinced of its merits, have admitted the
results of lie-detector tests in evidence in unappealed and therefore un-
reported cases.
4 9
Objections to the admission of the lie-detector in evidence.-The many'
objections which have been raised to the admigsion of the results of lie-,
detector tests are roughly classifiable in three groups: (1) unfounded objec-
tions resulting from either a misunderstanding of the machine or of its
proposed place in the trial; (2) objections, sound and unsound, which al-
though directed at the lie-detector, apply equally to all expert testimony
4 51d. at 71.
4 61d. at 69.
47Marston, op. cit. supra note 39, at 21.48McEvoy, sipra note 43, at 70.
The lie-detector has been put to many novel uses also. For instance, the Secretary
of the National Council of Bar Examiners reported its use in one mid-western state
in testing candidates for admission to the bar, and recommended its universal adoption
for such purpose in doubtful cases. N. Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1939, p. 7, col. 1.491924-Municipal Criminal Court of Indianapolis [Marston, op. cit. mrpra note 39,
at 20]; 1935-Circuit Court of Columbia Co., Wis., in State v. Loviello and Gregano
[Inbau, Deception of Detection Technique Admitted in Evidence (1935) 26 J. CRIM.
L. 262]; 1935-Circuit Court of Cook Co., Ill., in Reuter v. Hillberg [Marston, op.
cit. supra note 39, at 20]; 1936-Circuit Court of Fond du Lac Co., Wis., in State
v. Rowe [Note (1936) 26 J. CRIm. L. 758]; 1938-Magistrate's Court of Chicago[N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1938, p. 25, col. 2]; 3941--Circuit Court of Forest Co., Wis.,
in State v. Conn [Note (1943) Wis. L. Rxv. 430, 435].
1943-King's Co. Ct. of N. Y. in People v. Goldman [Judge Leibowitz set aside ver-
dict of guilty in rape case after convicted man submitted to a lie-detector test -permitted
by the judge because of discrepancies in the testimony on the trial. N. Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1943, p. 58, col. 4; Dec. 8, 1943, p. 25, col. 7; Dec. 30, 1943, p. 10, col. 8.
A new trial was subsequently ordered. N. Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1943, p. 10, col. 8. The
use of the lie-detector in the Goldman ,case became an issue in the subsequent trial of
the complainant for perjury. In the later trial, Judge Taylor refused the defendant
permission to take a lie-detector test. N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1944, p. 27, col. 1; Feb. 26,
1944, p. 28, col. 2].
'1944-Magistrate's Court of N. Y. C. [Magistrate Masterson released defendant
charged with possession of policy slilis after Dr. Kubis of Fordham had testified to
the reliability of the lie-detector, and to the absence of indications of deception on the
part of the defendant when so tested. N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1944, § 4, p. 38, col. 7].
Results of lie-detector tests have also been admitted in Ohio, California, Michigan
and Washington in unippealed and therefore unreported cases [Marston, op. cit. .rupra
note 39, at 20; Venters, Use of Lie Detectors, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 5, 1935, p. 1134].
In Chicago, some judges use the lie-detector in determining cases tried without a jury
and in hearings for application for parole [Johnston, The Magic Lie Detector, SAT. EVE.
PosT, April 29, 1944, p. 102].
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based upon scientific investigation; (3) valid objections arising from the
unusual nature of the lie-detector.
(1)' Those objections which are based upon misunderstanding or mis-
information can be disposed of by a description of the technique and its pro-
posed use in the trial. The lie-detector 50 is a machine which records those
involuntary bodily changes, not visibly discernible, which accompany the
emotions involved in conscious deception and the apprehension of detection.
Contrary to some writers,51 the fear of being prosecuted for a crime is not
the sole cause of a suppression reaction; any real motive, whether pecuniary
or personal, for concealing the answer from the operator is believed suffi-
cient. 52 Hence, the lie-detector would be effective in civil, as well as in
criminal, cases.
Some critics fear that conscious faking or emotional reactions other than
fear of deception, such as extreme excitement or fear of the test, would
often cause a wrong diagnosis. Conscious faking is effectively foiled by the
recording of involuntary physical reactions; change in blood pressure, pulse
rate, and electrodermal response. Thefollowing description by Keeler shows
how irrelevant factors are discounted by the examination procedure:
In order that the effect of existing environment, the present emotional
state, and the physical condition of the subject may be determined, a
polygraph recording is made for some minutes during which no ques-
tions are asked. Whatever the existing physiological and emotion con-
ditions might be, the resulting polygraph curves indicate the "norm"
for the period of the test. After this "norm" has been established, two
or three irrelevant questions are asked, then questions pertaining to
the crime, intermingled with irrelevant questions. Each question must
be worded briefly and call for a "yes" or "no" answer. The examiner's
mode of asking questions must be uniform as to rate, volume, and
inflection of speech all through the test.53
Another reason offered for barring the lie-detector is that a few indi-
viduals, because of physical54 or mental peculiarities,55 fail to experience
a recordable suppression reaction.56 In most instances, however, this in-
capacity is readily apparent, as. when it results from imbecility, insanity,
intoxication, or extreme obesity. The great value of the lie-detector should
5OFor the rest of this discussion, the term "lie-detector" will refer only to the poly-
graph, which combines the advantages of the several types of lie-detector machines
and which is most generally accepted as superior. See note 3 s71pra. For a-short de-
scription of the polygraph, see Keeler, Debunking the Lie Detector (1934) 25 J. CRIr.
L. 153, 156; f6r a more technical description, see Hensley, The Lie Detector in Action(1940) 3 TFx. B. J. 482.51Comment (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 771, 773.521nbau, Methods of Detecting Deception (1934) 24 J. CRnIt. L. 1140, 1147.53Keeler, supra note 50, at 158.54E.g., intoxication, extreme obesity, a recent subjection to the third degree, a bad
cough.55Any mental peculiarity which prevents the subject from realizing he is not telling
the truth.56Trovillo, What the Lie Detector Caiet Do (1941) 32 J. CURM. L. 121 (illustrations
of cases where the lie-detector is ineffective).
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not be lost to the courts because in a small percentage of cases no record
definite enough to warrant a diagnosis is obtainable. In such cases the
lie-detector's report would neither impeach nor strengthen the subject's
credibility.
It is not proposed that lie-detector tests be made in the court room before
the jury,57 but rather that the record of the tests and the conclusions of
the expert examiner based upon it be offered in evidence as showing the
credibility of a witness.58 Such a use, hardly leading to the "abolition of
the jury" as has been charged, 59 makes unimportant the question of who shall
decide what questions are to be asked by the examiner. 60
As for the objection that the lie-detector, and not the testimony of the
expert, would become the issue, 61 once the lie-detector has been accepted by
the courts, the jury's only task would be to weigh the expert's testimon3
according to conventional standards.
(2) Some objections to admitting results of lie-detector tests are equally
applicable to other expert testimoiqy which is admitted in evidence. It is
urged, for instance, that because the tests are not infallible, they should
be barred. 62 Infallibility is not, and should not be, a prerequisite to the
admissibility of evidence.63  The proponents of the lie-detector make no
pretence to one hundred percent accuracy because its accuracy depends upon
an interpretation by the examiner who has human limitations. 4 But then,
many scientific matters which are admissible in evidence are subject to the
same limitation, the X-ray, diagnosis by physicians and psychiatrists, micro-
analysis, ballistics, and handwriting analysis, to mention a few. No testi-
mony can be considered absolutely reliable and to weigh it is the proper
function of the jury.
Two substantial dangers, it must be admitted, do attend the admission
of the results of lie-detector tests: (1) The jury (and the judge) may fail
to evaluate them properly; 65 (2) incompetent and unethical examiners may
57The court room is no better place for lie-detector tests than a crowded police sta-
tion. McCormick, supra note 36, at 501.58
"It must be borne in mind that the use of 'lie detectors' is not to establish any
independent fact in issue; its primary, indeed, its sole purpose is to demonstrate that
the defendant is worthy of belief. It is a device which tends to sustain or to discredit
the defendant's credibility." People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 869, 4 N. Y. S. (2d)
913, 914 (Co. Ct. 1938).59Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 202, 221.
6OPeople v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 872, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913, 917 (Co. Ct. 1938);
Forkosch, spra note 59, at 227.
61State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 658, 246 N. W. 314, 317 (1933).02peller, Scientific Aids in Proof (1939) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 328, 333, 340; 43
TIME 60 (Jan. 10, 1944). See McCormick, supra note 36, at 500, for a refutation of
this argument.
63"All that should be required as a condition is the preliminary testimony of a scien-
tist that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and that it has a reasonable
[italics added] measure of precision in its indications." 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDFNCE (2d ed.
1923) § 990.
64Trovillo, supra note 3, at 878; Inbau, Methods of Detection Deception (1934) 24
J. CRI. L. 1140, 1147; Note (1927) 8 FoRDIAm L. REV. 120, 122.
65Inbau,.supra note 37, at 62; Forkosch, supra note 59, at 230.
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give unsound or perjured testimony. 66 The first danger is inherent in our
jury system and is no greater in the case of a lie-detector expert than any
other expert. The second danger exists with testimony of all kinds. But
as Professor Morgan of Harvard has said:
Given a litigant willing to commit or suborn perjury and counsel
ready to encourage or wink at it, no exclusionary rule will deter them.
.... No rational procedure will sanction an exclusionary rule supported
only by its supposed efficacy to hinder or prevent false testimony .... OT
Neither fear of perjury nor distrust of the capacities of the judicial
tribunal has any pertinence to a consideration of the wisdom or pro-
priety of creating or retaining privileges against disclosure of relevant
data.68
(3) Certain real difficulties caused by the peculiar nature of the lie-
detector attend its use by the courts, but as the New York Court of Appeals
said concerning the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, "the fact that it
presents to the court novel questions [does not] preclude its admission upon
common-law principles." 609 '
Still these difficulties merit serious attention. First, a party might produce
only those tests which were favorable to himself, and his opponent would
not be able to examine him under the lie-detector, nor to cross-examine
him should he refuse to take the stand.70 Second, it 'would be difficult for
the opposing counsel to expose an incompetent or dishonest "expert" and
to cross-examine him concerning the tests, 71 because the' lie-detector is not
adequately standardized as to instrument, manner of conducting tests, quali-
fications of examiners, and interpretation of the records. 72
A Proposed Procedure to Regulate the Admission of the Results of Lie-
Detector Tests.-These difficulties could be largely surmounted by the adop-
tion of a suitable statute or proper court rules.73
The state should adopt a standard machine (preferably the polygraph
which is almost universally accepted) 74 and a standard method of giving
the tests and of interpreting the records. 75 What is more important, the
GoInbau, mtpra note-27, at 502; Inbau, Deception of Detection Technique Admitted in
Evidence (1935) 26 J. CRIm. L. 262, 270; Keeler, supra note 50, at 158.67Morgan's Foreword to the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
(1942) 6.
681d. at 7. Italics added.
69People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 604, 109 N. E. 6181 623 (1915).71State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 659, 246 N. W. 314, 318 (1933).71Ibid; Inbau, op. cit. supra note 37, at 64.
721nbau, op. cit. supra note 37, at 63.73The need for regulation is well recognized. Marston writes, "I have received
letters from jurists and from Bar Associations all over the country inquiring about the
lie-detector and how it can be made available for local use." MARSTON, THE LIE-
DETEcTOR TEST (1938) 76. The need for regulation is pointed out by Justice Fitzgerald
in People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 872, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913, 917 (Co. Ct. 1938), and
by the late Dean Wigmore in WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1935) § 967.74See note 3 supra.75For a description of the generally approved method, see Trovillo, Deception Test
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state should license lie-detector experts as it now does certified public ac-
countants, physicians and lawyers. 76 The qualifications for lie-detector ex-
perts, as well as the other standards, should be determined with the advice
of the most experienced authorities in the field.
77
The trial judge should be given discretionary authority to appoint a licensed
expert, whenever a lie-detector test is requested by one of the parties or
seems desirable to the judge. Before appointing a lie-detector expert, -he
should first give the parties opportunity to propose experts and to object
to any, expert under consideration. If the parties agreed upon the choice
of an expert, he should be appointed.
A witness's refusal- to take a lie-detector test after one is ordered by
the court should be subject to mention to the jury and punishable as con-
tempt of court.78 Either party should have the right to employ a licensed
expert other than the one appointed by the court.
Immediately following a test, the expert should be required to file with
the court a report of the test, including the record and his conclusions. This
report should be open to inspection by the interested parties for a reasonable
time before the expert is called to the stand, and any disputes or questions
caused by the report should be settled by the judge at a special hearing for
that purpose. This would give counsel ample opportunity both to prepare a
cross-examination and to discover any prejudicial or incompetent matter
contained in the report, before it is offered to the jury.
The testimony of the expert examiner should be admissible as bearing
upon the credibility of the witness examined. Either counsel, and perhaps
the judge, should be allowed to question the expert concerning his experi-
ence and other qualifications, the method used during the examination, and
his conclusions.
The compensation to be paid an expert called by the court, should be
fixed by the court at a reasonable sum. This sum should be paid by the
Criteria (1942) 33 J. CRIm. L. 338, 339; Keeler, Debunking the Lie Detector (1934)
25 J. Cnmt. L 153, 158.76Keeler, supra note 75, at 159.771n 1941 there were less than 100 trained experts in the United States. McEvoy,
The Lie Detector Goes into Business (Feb. 1941) 38 READER'S DIGEST 69, 71.
The following qualifications are recommended by authorities: (1) long experience in
criminal, business, social, and professional matters, (2) honesty, (3) an 8 months'
training. See 15 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 162, 164.
78Such a provision, it may be objected, would be violative of the witness's privilege
against self-incrimination. This objection is well refuted by Dean Hardman of the
University of West Virginia School of Law: "Such an objection .... seems untenable,
for despite some dissent it is now generally held that the privilege applies only to
compelled testimony as distinguished from nontestimonial evidence, and it "would seem
that the recordations of the lie detector 'do not constitute a testimonial utterance within
the meaning of the privilege inasmuch as the evidentiary value of the data sought to be
used in the court lies in the physical reaction of the person subjected to the test rather
than in the words used by him. That this is so is indicated by the fact, among others,
that the recordations are the same whether the person taking the test answers questions
or remains silent." Hardman, Lie Detectors, Investigation, Courts (1941) 48 W. VA.
L. REv. 37, 39. See also Note (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rav. 1138; Inbau, Methods of
Detecting Deception, 24 J. CaIn. L. 1140, 1151.
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state in criminal cases and assessed as costs in civil cases. Experts not
appointed by the court should be paid by the party calling them.7 9
Charlotte L. Snwllwood
Evidence: New York Parol Evidence Rule: Procedural or Substantive
Law.-in Zell z. American Seating Company, 138 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A.
2d., 1943),i the action was for commissions alleged to have been earned in
obtaining war contracts. The defendant claimed that the contract was-em-
bodied wholly in a written memorial. The plaintiff claimed that the contract
was composed of a written memorial and an accompanying oral agreement.
The plaintiff has been paid the stipulated monthly compensation called for
in the written contract and now sues for a three per cent commission on the
contract or purchase price of the war contracts obtained for the defendant.
The relevant part of the written contractoprovided: ". . . the Company may,
if it desires, pay you something in the!0 r-of ' a bonus.' 2 The, alleged oral
agreement provided that, in addition to'the stipulated monthly compensation,
the plaintiff should receive a comn-mission of the three to eight per cent of the
contract or purchase price of any war contracts obtained. The exact per-
centage between the two figures was left to be determined at a later date.
All of the negotiations of the 'parties took place in Grand Rapids, Michigan.
The principal case also raises an interesting problem of Federal Procedure.
However, that problem is not within the scope of this note.
Mr. Justice Frank, writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in
the Zell case says in reference to the parol evidence rule: "The substan-
tive character of the rule, although perhaps shadowy, still exists in New
79These suggestions are merely tentative, being modelled for the most part upon
Chapter Five ("Expert and Opinion Evidence") of the American Law Institute's
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE and the Uniform Expert Testimony Act. The procedure
suggested would,. it is believed, satisfy the requirements for regulation upon which
Wigmore conditioned his approval of the use of the lie-detector in court. WiGoP.E,
CODE OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1935) § 967.
1The District Court for the Southern District of New York [50 F. Supp. 543(1943)] granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that to allow
the plaintiff to prove his alleged collateral agreement would violate the parol evidence
rule. Upon appeal, to the Circuit Court (Second Circuit) the decision of -the lower
court was reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
February 28, 1944, and on May 8, 1944 the Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals
and reestablished the holding of the District Court by the following opinion: "Per
Curium: In this case two members of the Court think that the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Seven are of the opinion that the judgment
should be reversed and the judgment of the district court affirmed-four because
proof of the contract alleged in respondent's affidavits on the motion for summaryjudgment is precluded by the applicable state parol evidence rule, and three because
the contract is contrary to public policy and void, . . ." [12 U. S. L. WuaK 3371 (U. S.
1944)].
2138 F. (2d) 641, 642 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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York."3 This cryptic statement by Mr. Justice Frank is rather startling in
the light of the views xpressed by the leading text-writers in the fields of
evidence and contracts. James Bradley Thayer, the great pioneer in the
rationalization of the rules of evidence, tells us that the parol evidence
rule is a rule of substantive law defining contracts, deeds, wills, judgments,
or the like.4 Wigmore, at the outset of his discussion of the subject, em-
phatically states that the rule is "in no sense a rule of Evidence but a rule
of Substantive Law." Williston on Contracts6 sets forth.the same theory as
that laid down by Thayer and Wigmore.
Professor McCormick seems to be the only author who suggests the view
that the parol evidence rule may be procedural in some of its aspects. He
points out in his article, "The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device
for Control of the Jury,"' 7 that, in the determination of whether parol
evidence should be admitted, the division of power between the judge and
jury is procedural. He says:
The anesthetic qualities of the language-technique about "contra-
dicting," "admissibility" and "completeness" which the court have in-
herited, and the preoccupation of the great text writers, Thayer, Wig-
more, and Williston, with the substantive aspect of the parol evidence
doctrine, have contributed to the almost complete absence in the 're-
ported appellate opinions of any real discussion of the practical adminis-
trative problem of division of power between judge and jury.,
Mr. Justice Frank's cryptic statement as to the rule may have been based
upon the same ideas which are set forth in Professor McCormick's article,
or upon the decisions of certain cases in New York, or, perhaps, upon both.
A rule of thumb definition of what is procedure, might be stated as
follows: If the decision is one which is made as one of the formal steps of
a trial or hearing, as a part of the operation of the court machine, it may
be said to be procedural rather than substantive.
In New York the patrol evidence rule has been comprehensively stated
by Mr. Justice Pound in Newburger v. American Surety Co.9 as follows:
Parol evidence may not be received to vary the clear and unambiguous
terms of a solemn written agreement between the parties although mat-
ters may be proved which tend to show fraud, mistake, illegality, want
of consideration, lack of capacity of any other matter affecting the
validity of the writing or to establish the existence of a separate oral
agreement as to any matter on which the document is silent, and which
31d. at 643.4
THAYER, PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898) 408-9.
59 WIG eoRE, EviDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2400.
63 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) §631.
7McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the
Jury (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 365.81d. at 380.
9242 N. Y. 134 151 N. E. 155 (1926).
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is not inconsistent with its terms, where from the circumstances of
the case the court infers that the parties may not intend the document
to be a complete and final statement of the whole of the transaction be-
tween them, or to establish a condition precedent to the attaching of an
obligation under the contract.'0
This statement of the rule certainly does not fall within the above stated
rule of thumb definition as to procedure. This fact is further substantiated
by numerous New York Court of Appeals decisions which have both im-
pliedly and expresslv ~be that the rule is one of substantive law."1
However, an aIei r e nt, based upon Brady v. Nally,12 might be offered
to show that the rule may have procedural aspects. In the Brady case the
contract provided for payment upon completion of the work. Evidence
was admitted, without objection and without motion to strike it out, to
show an oral agreement to pay on other terms. The court said, "the parties
have the right to make a rule of evidence for their own case and they are
presumed to have done so when testimony, otherwise incompetent, is re-
ceived without objection and without any effort to have it stricken from
the minutes or disregarded by the trial court."'8 The decision of the Court
of Appeals was, in effect, that if the admission of parol evidence is not
objected to in some manner in the trial court, it cannot be objected to in
the appellate court. Although substantive as well as procedural rules of law
may be waived, the right to waive the rule might be classified as procedural.
Mr. Justice Vann, who wrote the decision in the Brady case, in dealing
with the same question in Loomis v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R.R. Co.,14 said:
No effect can be given to such evidence even when received with-
out objection, provided the court is asked in due form to instruct the
jury that it is merged in the written agreement if they found there
was one.
15
The latest case to infer that the parol evidence rule might be viewed as
procedural, in some aspect, is Higgs v. DeMaziroff.I6 The action was upon
three promissory notes. The defendant's affirmative defense was that the
notes were delivered subject to an oral condition that they were not to be
paid or enforced until paintings for which they were given were sold, and
then only out of the proceeds of the sale. Although the plaintiff did not
expressly move to strike out the oral evidence as violating the parol evidence
10d. at 142, 151 N. E. at 157.
"lWilson v. Deen, 74 N. Y. 531 (1878); Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288 (1885)
Lese v. Lamprech, 196 N. Y. 32, 89 N. E. 581 (1909) ; Ruppert v. Singhie, 243 N. Y.
156, 153 N. E. 33 (1926); Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N. Y. 377, 160 N. E. 646, 68 A. L. R.
239 (1928).
12151 N. Y. 258, 45 N. E. 547 (1897).
"id. at 264-5, 45 N. -E. at 549.
14203 N. Y. 359, 96"N. E. 748 (1911).
IVd. at 367, 96 N. E. at 751.
16263 N. Y. 473, 189 N. E. 555, 92 A, L. R. 807 (1934).
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rule, the plaintiff did move to dismiss defendant's affirmative defense. The
trial court denied this motion. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff's motion amounted to a motion to strike out the parol
evidence and should have been granted. This decision is in accord with the
earlier decisions of the court in the Brady and Loomis cases.
As previously indicated, the parol evidence rule may be procedural in
still another aspect. When one party to an action introduces in evidence a
written agreement and the other party offers an oral agreement, two questions
arise. These questions are stated by Professor McCormick as follows:
(1) Was this writing intended by the parties, to displace this as-
serted oral agreement?
(2) Who decides whether the document was intended to super-
sede the alleged oral contract ?1 7
McCormick points out that there are two plausible answers to the second
question. Namely, the power lies either in the judge, or in the judge and
jury. He examines four available expedients in administering the parol
evidence rule.
First, the crude, older method of choice by the trial judge between
the rule against "varying, altering, or adding to, a writing," and the
formulas for "incomplete writings" and "collateral contracts," with the
real motives for the choice left almost inarticulate ..... .* * *
Second, we may advocate the plan of resolving the whole matter
into one of the application of the standard express intent, with no special
treatment for written transaction except this, that the trial judge shall
determine as a preliminary fa~t-qu'estion whether a given alleged oral
agreement was intended by the parties to be abandoned when the writ-
ing-w~s signed. * * *
Third, . . . . Let the trial judge use the same machinery for control of
the jury wnich he always has available. If, in his opinion, reasonable
minds could reach but one conclusion from the evidence, he is em-
powered to withdraw that question from the jury.
Fourth ..... Let the trial judge, after hearing the testimony as to the
alleged oral agreement, including the evidence of substantiating cir-
cumstances, compare it with the terms of the writing, and if he considers
that it is one which parties situated, as these were would "naturally
and normally" have recited in the writing itself, had they made it and
intended it to stand,; then he -will reject the evidence thus tentatively
heard. On the other hand, if . . . he concludes that the alleged, oral pact
is "such an agreement as might normally be made as a separate agree-
ment by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract,"
then he will allow the evidence to go to the jury ..... He will still, if
he admits the evidence and the proof is conflicting, submit to the jury
lVMcCormik, The Parol Evidentce Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the
Jury. (1932) 41 YALF L. J. 365, 375.
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the issues: was the oral agreement made as claimed, and, if so, was
it intended to be displaced by the written terms ?18
Professor McCormick sharply criticizes the first expedient, which is the
one used by the courts at present, and urges the adoption of the fourth
method.
The focal point, to which attention must be directed, is not whether the
authority should be given to the judge or to the judge and jury, but, that
regardless of which has the final decision, the formal steps taken by the trial
court in applying this part of the parol evidence rule are procedural. If
this procedural aspect of the rule is recognized, Professor McCormick's
views on the apportionment of the duties between the bench and the jury
box may very well be adopted.
Wigmore expressly gives the authority to determine the intention of the
parties to the trial judge,19 but he does not cite any case in point and
apparently treats it as an incidental feature of the parol evidence rule. As
for a formula to be used, he says: "In deciding upon this intent, the chief
and most satisfactory index for the, judge is found in the circumstance
whether' or not the particular elenwnt of the alleged extrinsic nwgotiation is
dealt with at all in the writing."20 WillistorA iinplies that the "court"2' 1 passes
upon the question of intention of the parties, and then goes on to give his
formula for determining admissibility. 22
Professor McCormick seems to be the only writer who propounds the
theory that the administrative problem of division of power between judge
and jury, in relation to the parol evidence rule, is a procedural aspect of
the rule.
Even though most of the decisions of the New York courts flatly state
that the parol evidence rule is substantive, the decisions in Brady v. Nally,
Loomis v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.R. Co., and Higgs v. DeMaziroff certainly
intimate that the rule may be procedural in at least one aspect, and Professor
McCormick sheds light on still another possible procedural aspect of the
rule. These considerations undoubtedly underlie Mr. Justice Frank's state-
ment that "the substantive character of the rule, although perhaps shadowy,
still exists in New York."23
When the parties to an action enter into a contract in New York and
the suit on the contract is brought in New York, and the question of
181d. at 377-9.
19 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2430. In note 3 the author states: "Some-
times, but erroneously, the question of intent is left for the jury."
209 WiGuoRE, EViDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2430.
213 WrLLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 633.
223 Id. § 638. "The test of admissibility is much affected by the inherent possibility
of parties who contract under the circumstances in question, simultaneously making
the agreement- in writing which is before the court and also the alleged parol agree-
ment. The point is not merely whether the court is convinced that the parties before
it did in fact do this, but whether the parties so situated generally would or might
do so."
23138 F. (2d) 641, (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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whether. or not the parol evidence rule is to be applied arises, it does not
make any difference whether the courts call the rule substantive or proce-
dural. However, when the contract is made in a foreign state and a suit is
instituted in New York or in a federal court sitting in New York, a con-
flict of laws problem arises and it is of great importance whether the rule
is held to be substantive or procedural. For this reason, it is hoped that the
New York court, in future decisions, will more clearly identify the substan-
tive and procedural aspects of the rule.
Alvah W. Burlingame III
Labor Law: Discharge of "wildcat" strikers: Discrimination.-Increas-
ing dissatisfaction over the frequency of "wildcat" strikes in industry
prevails. The present national crisis makes them a matter of grave concern.
What is the status of the "wildcat" strikers? That was the problem before
the court in Western Cartridge Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 139
F. (2d) 855 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
The employees on the day shift in the cupping department of the com-
pany's plant were disgruntled because of the dilatory tactics of the company
in negotiating certain grievances as to 'Working conditions and an increase
in wages. On July 3, 1942, the day shift quit work. The superintendent
told the employees that the company would not set a definite date to hear
their grievances until they returned to work. When the men refused, they
were given suspension slips, which notified them to appear before the disci-
pline board on July 6. The superintendent rejected similar demands made
by the employees of the second and third shifts, who also quit work and
were given suspension slips. On July 7, the discipline board discharged the
eighteen men of the first shift who had gone on strike and hired others to
fill their places. However, different treatment was accorded the employees
of the other two shifts, for their jobs were kept open for them until their
return.
The Circuit Court of Appeals found, in a proceeding by the company
to set aside the order of the National Labor Relations Board, that although
substantial evidence supported the finding of the Board that the company
had been guilty of unfair labor practices in the light of the persistent hostility
to the organization of its employees in violation of section 8 (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, yet its unfair labor practices were not the
cause of the strike.
The court held that since the employees were not negotiating as members
of the union nor under any claim of bargaining rights, the strike was a
"wildcht" strike.2 Moreover, the company was engaged in the manufacture
of munitions of war and the strike was a violation of their solemn pledge
not to strike for the duration of the war. Nor had these employees resorted
to the ample machinery set up by the government for the settlement of labor
'139 F. (2d) 855, 857.21d. at 859.
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disputes. Without violating section 8 (3) of the Act,3 the company had the
right to discharge the striking employees or to refuse to take them back into
its employ if the company did not discriminate against them so as "to en-
courage or discovrage membership in any labor organization."4 The order
of the Board under section 8 (3) of the Act was refused enforcement be-
cause there was no evidence to sustain the Board's finding of discrimination
in refusing to rehire the striking employees.
In interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, the courts have held that
the Act "does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the em-
ployer to select its employee's or to discharge them."5 Indeed, the Act pro-
vides that the employee is entitled to the protection of the Act only where
he is engaged in concerted activities to achieve his right to self-organization,
and the advantages attendant upon it. Employees who engage in a "wildcat"
strike are subject to discharge because it is an illegal act. A "wildcat"
strike is a concerted activity dissociated from the activity of any labor
organization.6
Employees who take part in a "wildcat" strike are in no better pqsition
than employees who engage in a."sit-down" strike. The Supreme Court of
the United States, in National Labor Relations Bdard z. Fansteel Metal-
hlrgical Corp.,7 recognized that the seizure and forcible retention of an em-
ployer's factory by employees in a "sit-down" strike, even though caused
by the employer's unfair labor practices, was a good ground for the discharge
of the employees. The Act contemplated only a lawful strike.
An illegal strike may result from a breach of contract by the employees
as well as from their tortious conduct. In National Labor Relations Board v.
Sands Manufacturin.g Co.,s and in National Labor Relations Board v. Coltom-
bian Enameling & Stamping Co.,9 the contracts which the respective unions
had with the employers contained a no-strike provision. In both cases, the
unions sanctioned a strike in violation of their agreements. The United
States Supreme Court held that an effective discharge of the employees for
the repudiation of their agreement was not prohibited by the Act, any more
than was a discharge for a tort committed against the employer.
"The statute does not interfere with the normal right of the employer to
select or discharge his employees,"' 0 nor does the statute provide that "the
relationship held in statu quo under Title 29, Section 152 (3), shall con-
tinue in absence of wrongful conduct on the part of the employer and rightful
conduct on the part of the employees."' " Otherwise the right of the em-
3C. 372, § 8 (3),49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1940).
4139 F. (2d) 855, 858.3National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
45-46, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 628 (1937).
6in the Matter of Weirton Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America, Local
6295, 34 Decis. and Orders of N.L.R.B. 1255, 1271.
7306 U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct. 490 (1939).
8306 U. S. 332, 59 Sup. Ct. 508 (1939).
9306 U. S. 292, 59 Sup. Ct. 501 (1939).
'
0See note 5 .supra.
11See noie 7 mipra.
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ployer to' select and discharge his employees in the absence of intimidation
or coercion would be cut Off. Section 8 (3)12 of the Act imposes only one
limitation upon the employer's right to hire, fire, promote, transfer or de-
mote his employees. The factor motivating the employer's action must not
be the union membership, activity or relationship of the worker. Discharge
for no reason at all 'is lawful if the purported absence of cause is not anti-
unionism disguised as a whim.
Whether discrimination exists or not is a question of fact, the determination
of which must be supported by substantial evidence.' 3 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that an employee, who was discharged because he
refused to work while an illegal strike was going on, could not complain of
discrimination by the employer where others were discharged for the illegal
strike, even though members of the same union were rehired. 14 The court was
unable to find in the record of the Western Cartridge Co. case any substan-
tial evidence to support a finding of the Board that the company's actions
against its striking employees were taken to discourage membership in a labor
organization, either in the matter of their hire or tenure. Even though the
exclusive right of the Board to draw inferences could be drawn. The em-
ployees of the day shift belonged to the same union as the employees of the
other two shifts, but as to them no charge of discrimination was made.15
The avowed purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was to prevent
the industrial strife occasioned by labor disputes as a burden upon and to
interstate commerce. This purpose was to be achieved by encouraging col-
lective bargaining and protecting the workers in their freedom of association
and self-organization.16 By declaring a "wildcat" strike illegal, the court,
in the Western Cartridge Co. case, outlawed it as an anti-social device of
self-help, not within the protection of the Act.' 7
John Francis Sullivan
12C. 372, § 8 (3), 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1940).
'
3 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 61 Sup.
Ct. 845 (1941).
14Ibid.
15139 F. (2d) 855, 859.
16C. 372, § 1, 49 STAT. 449 (1935) 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940).
17"While high officials of the United Automobile Workers, C.I.O., looked on, the
Ford Motor Company today discharged 10 men for participating in a Rouge Plant dis-
turbance in which a plant protection man was beaten and a labor relations office dam-
aged." Mr. R. J. Thomas, president of the union, denounced the action of the "wildcat"
strikers as contrary to the policy of the union. N. Y. Times, Mar. 10; 1944, p. 17,
N. Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 10, 1944, p. 1.
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